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ABSTRACT
 
A large scale technological effort is required to insure that the
 
nation has a dependable supply of critical minerals and fuels at socially
 
and economically acceptable costs. The required level of technological
 
effort implies governmental programs and the selection of institutions
 
for the performance of research and development. The choice of insti­
tutions has profound implications for social, political, and economic
 
structures; therefore, such choices must be carefully based on relevant
 
criteria. Institutional criteria have not been heretofore developed in
 
any comprehensive, analytical framework.
 
A. STRUCTURE, DESIGN, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
 
The thesis addresses the question of the most suitable institutional
 
arrangements which will best meet the national interest in the area 
of
 
mineral resource development and technology. The challenges and require­
ments of the minerals sector are examined. Then the institutional
 
practices of national research programs are investigated. These investi­
gations lead to the development of criteria for institutional choice
 
which are then applied to the particular features of the minerals sector.
 
Alternative institutional possibilities are discussed, leading to specific
 
recommendations for a national mineral resource development institution.
 
B. THE CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE MINERALS SECTOR. 
The principal challenge is keeping the real cost of minerals on a
 
declining curve in the face of rapidly accelerating demand and decreasing
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supplies of high grade deposits and reservoirs. The need for environ­
mental protection and pollution control complicates the problem. Tech­
nology is required to meet these challenges; however, the minerals sector
 
is poorly equipped to provide the required technological effort. Minerals
 
education is in decline. The minerals industry is relatively fragmented
 
and not research intensive. There is no national policy on mining and
 
minerals. Governmental efforts in minerals technology are relatively
 
small and poorly coordinated.
 
C. 	IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
 
Since 1940, federal managers have utilized a bewildering array of
 
institutional mechanisms for the accomplishment of public science programs. 
Institutional means have been bent to program ends. Results of this 
practice have included the intertwining of public and private enterprise, 
raising issues of governmental accountability and responsibility. 
Patterns of new federalism have developed which have reshaped the American
 
political society. Criteria of institutional choice have not existed in
 
any comprehensive framework, nor have their implications been analyzed.
 
D. CRITERIA FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
 
Twenty-five criteria are identified, discussed, and analyzed in
 
relationship to institutional alternatives. These criteria are arranged
 
in eight general categories as follows: Nature of the R&D Program;
 
Merit of the R&D Program; Public and Private Interest; Efficiency and
 
Effectiveness; Governmental Responsibility; Participation and Repre­
sentation; Educational Considerations; and Technology Transfer and Past
 
Practice.
 
E. INSTITUTIONS FOR MINERALS RESEARCH
 
Application of criteria of institutional choice to the problems 
of the minerals sector leads to the recommendation of the establishment 
of a National Institute of Minerals Research and Development (NIMRAD). 
This institution is designed to serve as a focal point for the revi­
talization and mobilization of technological effort in industry, edu­
cation, and government. NIMRAD will also serve to translate national 
minerals policy into effective action. 
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PREFACE
 
The issues involved in the interrelationships of mineral resources
 
and public policy are as old as civilized man. The major issues created
 
in the United States boy the choice of institutions to perform national
 
research and development programs are less than thirty years old. The
 
intent of this study is to examine these issues and to achieve something
 
of a synthesis in the form of analysis and recommendations of institutional
 
choice for the conduct of the nation's minerals research programs.
 
The inception of the study goes back to 1966 when the U. S. Bureau
 
of Mines asked for and received authorization to contract-out research
 
and development. After a half century of pure in-house research effort,
 
the Bureau faced new questions and new problems. For two years after 1966,
 
I was counted among those who believed strongly that in-house operations
 
provided the only legitimate, straightforward, acceptable way of perform­
ing government research programsi This belief stemmed from some personal
 
resentment on the part of a government employee at the higher wages that 
government contractors could pay their employees out of government funds 
-- higher wages than we civil servants could command for similar work 
also paid out of government funds. Professionally, as a personnel special­
ist, my reluctance to accept contracting-out stemmed from the prospect of 
providing contractors with the resources with which they could effectively 
compete with the government for required technological manpower. W reser­
vations on these two points still stand, but other considerations have 
come to the fore. 
The opportunity for further reflection, study, and investigation of 
these and related issues was made possible when the Bureau of Nines 
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encouraged and supported me in a course of full-time study. The other
 
essential aspect of the opportunity was the existence of the newly es­
tablished Program for Advanced Study in Public Science Policy and Adminis­
tration at the University of New Mexico. The resources of the Program,
 
supported by NASA and developed by Dr. Albert Rosenthal, have provided
 
the means and framework for this study. The counsel of Dr. Rosenthal,
 
Dr. John Hunger, and Dr. Lloyd Woodruff have materially furthered the
 
study.
 
.I must also express my deep appreciation and debt to all sixteen of 
my colleagues in the first PASPSPA program. Their constructive advice, 
sharing of experiences, and friendly competition have contributed signifi­
cantly. The influences of faculty and colleagues have encouraged a staff
 
administrative specialist to embark on a study of the complex interface
 
between technology, socliety, and public policy in a significant sector of
 
our economy. The merits and strengths of this study'are due in large
 
measure to the aforementioned. Any shortcomings, omissions, and errors
 
of interpretation are my own.
 
CHAPTER I 
MINERALS TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE: AN OVERVIEW 
The Malthusian statement of the problem of mineral resources is
 
forthright: As the finite supply of minerals becomes depleted and as
 
utilization rapidly increases, we face an inevitable crisis of shortage
 
of the basic material elements of our industrial society. As with other
 
dire Malthusian predictions, this one has been disproven or at least de­
ferred by rapid advances in the technologies of minerals exploration,
 
extraction, processing, and utilization. The technological advances have
 
been great enough to meet tremendous increases in minerals demand in the
 
last century. The question remains, however, whether technology will be
 
able to meet the future challenges of even greater demand, of shrinking
 
resources, and of pressure toward rising real costs, not only in the United
 
States and other developed economies but also in the rest of the fast de­
l 
veloping world.
 
While the harsh doctrine of scarcity has perhaps been alleviated by
 
technology, the isste has shifted to concerns of cost. Resource economists
 
today view scarcity as not physical but as cost-relevant. As one leading
 
economist has stated:
 
While this new viewpoint modifies the problem of scarcity,
 
it by no means solves it. If the costs of obtaining scarce natural
 
resource products, or of developing substitutes for them, should
 
rise significantly in relation to other costs, society would be
 
devoting larger shares of manpower and capital to their production.
 
At best, rising real cost would be a drag on the continued improve­
ment in average levels of living; i could halt, or even reverse,
 
the upward trend of recent decades.
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Still, the conventional solution is viewed as one of advancing tech­
nology, now addressed to cost factors as well as problems of resource
 
availability. 
The role of science in natural resource development is highly 
significant. President John F. Kennedy noted this emphatically in 1963 
as the first item on his technological agenda: "This seems to me the 
greatest challenge to science of our times, to use the world's resources, 
to expand life and hope for the world's inhabitants. While these are es­
sentially applied problems, they require guidance and support from basic 
science.
 
The concern of government today about the technological problems of
 
minerals is well stated by Interior Secretary Walter J. Hickel:
 
With respect to the Nation's long-range mineral position,
 
we believe the United States has cause for deep concern. It is
 
our considered opinion that unless an urgent effort to up-grade
 
minerals and mining technology is launched soon, we face the
 
possibility that the growth in our standard of living will bee 4
 
limited due to mineral resource constraints within 20 to 30 years.
 
In-his challenging book, The Age of Discontinuity, Peter F. Drucker 
sees four new industries on the horizon which will shape the future of our 
social economy. One of these is the materials industry, implying the ad­
vent of a new materials technology.5 But new technologies create new
 
kinds of problems. As technology has transformed atoms and molecules
 
into the basic building blocks of natural resources, in place of ores and
 
mineral deposits, we face new social problems and new opportunities for
 
6 
choice among ever-widening alternatives.
 
The technology of mineral resource extraction, processing, and uti­
lization has been heavily responsible for the scarring of our land and the
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pollution of our environment. Suddenly, the quality of our environment
 
has become one of the primary political issues of our time. The scarcity
 
and cost aspects of the minerals problem have been joined by the environ­
mental issue. The question becomes one of how we can enjoy the benefits
 
of an industrial society and an affluent economy, resting on the base of
 
minerals extraction and utilization, without destroying our environment.
 
If this is not possible, then what materials and substances can we use
 
instead of minerals?
 
Again, the conventional solution is advancing technology to cope
 
with the environmental problems of the minerals sector. But the conventional
 
wisdom is no longer accepted uncritically. Former Interior Secretary
 
Stewart Udall was an early critic of what he termed "the myth of scientific
 
supremacy" and the general "let-science-fix-it-tomorrow attitude."7 In
 
fact, to many, technology has clearly become more a cause of the problem
 
than a potential solution to it.
 
Another alternative to advancing technology has presented itself in
 
the form of what Kenneth Boulding calls the spaceship economy, indicating
 
a change on earth from: Ilan open society characterized by a throughput
 
of material (with ores and fossil fuels as inputs and pollutable reservoirs
 
as recipients of outputs), to a closed society in the material sense, in
 
which there are no longer any mines or pollutable reservoirs, and in which
 
8
 
therefore all material has to berecycled." Boulding is joined by John
 
Kenneth Galbraith in advocating a low- or no-growth economy, extreme
 
conservation, and restricted consumption as means of correcting our in­
duatrially created environmental problems. 
9 
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It is difficult to believe that a society such as ours, so incul­
cated with the values of growth and progress, could accept a non-growth,
 
We tend to be action oriented, which
restricted consumption economy. 

again raises the necessity of searching for technological solutions to
 
But the search must embrace more than naked technology.
pressing problems. 

Our modern natural resource problem involves a broad social adjustment to
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the adverse effects of technological change and economic growth.
 
Barnett and Morse phrase it succinctly: "The capacity of scientific pro­
gress to create new problems for society, it appears, has outrun the
 
capacity of social progress to solve them."11 In terms of governmental
 
action programs to meet the challenges of our time, it would seem that new
 
institutions and new political theory are needed.
 
One authority has stated that the "professionalization of science
 
during the nineteenth century rested upon the building of new institutional
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forms for science education." Perhaps we may state that the legitimi­
zation of science in the governmental context is now also dependent on
 
the development of new institutional forms. A profuse variety of new forms
 
have in fact developed, but not in any coherent or systematic way, during
 
the great leap of science to public prominence in the last thirty years.
 
The effects of the institutional choices made during those years have not
 
truly.been assessed.
 
The genius of our political system lies in part in its institutional
 
arrangements. The design of such arrangements is no less important in
 
regularizing and legitimizing the place of technology in the arena of
 
public policy. In a recent discussion, C. West Churchman stated that the
 
most pressing problems of the future may well be questions of decentral­
-7­
ization, not technology. In short: "How do we get more people in the
 
act?,13
 
In some ways more people are already getting into the act. One of
 
the most striking features of American life in the latter half of the
 
twentieth century has been the development of intimate interrelationships
 
between government, industry, and the academic world in areas of advanced
 
technology. This phenomenon has taken on the aspect of a closed system,
 
raising the question of representation of a broader public interest.
 
Most recently, in our stubbornly pluralistic society, questions of
 
technology have been dragged into the arena of public debate. Questions
 
of minerals technology and its relationship to the economy and the environ­
ment are sure to become increasingly important topics of political dis­
cussion.
 
The choice of institutions for the conduct of public research and
 
development programs in the past has had profound implications for our
 
social, political' and economic structures. There is no reason to believe
 
that future choices will be any less significant. Consequently, we must
 
choose carefully and develop institutional arrangements with an acute
 
sensitivity to the issues involved.
 
We come then finally to the objectives and structure of this study.
 
Quite simply, we are,addressing the question of the most suitable insti­
tutional arrangements which will best meet the national interest in the
 
area of mineral resource development and technology. We first look
 
closely at the challenges and requirements of the minerals sector. Then
 
we investigate the institutional practices of national research programs.
 
These investigations lead to the development of criteria for institutional
 
choice. We then apply the criteria to the particular features of the
 
miherals sector, discuss alternative institutional possibilities, and
 
arrive at specific recommendations for a national mineral resource
 
development institution which will serve the public interest.
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CHAPTER II
 
THE CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS
 
OF THE MINERALS SECTOR
 
From time to time during the last century, alarm has been voiced 
concerning the state of the minerals industry. Conventionally, the alarm 
has concerned the declining fortunes of mining interests, the inevitable 
depletion of natural mineral and fuel resources, and the decline of 
minerals education. An early example of this kind of concern is found 
in J. Ross Brownels report on western mineral resources in 1868: "No 
country in the world can show such wasteful systems of mining as prevail 
in ours . ... The question arises whether it is riot the duty of govern­
ment to prevent, as far as may be consistent with individual rights, this 
waste of a common heritage, in which not only ourselves but our posterity 
I
are interested.!' Browne was advocating passage of a bill sponsored by
 
Senator Stewart of Nevada to establish a National School of Mines to be
 
located in the mining region, operated by a Board ot Directors composed
 
of representatives of each mining state, with the primary objective of
 
2
 
applying science to mining.
 
Senator Stewart's enlightened bill failed of passage. We do not
 
have to this day a National School of Mines; we hardly have any schools
 
of mines of any description left in the United States. And the alarms
 
haire continued. In 1952, the President's Materials Policy Commission
 
(Paley Commission) issued a five volume review of the national resources
 
situation, and each volume expressed deep concern over some aspect of
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mineral resources.3 In 1963 the Senate conducted hearings entitled
 
State of the Minerals Industry which again called attention to the serious
 
problems facing the nation in regard to its minerals position. In 1969
 
the Senate again conducted hearings, this time on legislation proposed
 
by Senator Allott to establish a national mining and minerals policy.
5
 
Again, deep concern was voiced by a broad range of witnesses regarding
 
the seriousness of the national minerals situation.
 
These periodic alarms have not resulted in any coordinated action
 
to create solutions to well-understood problems. While minerals have
 
long been recognized as essential to the nation, they have not become the
 
subject of a coherent, forceful public policy. Senator Allott's modest
 
proposal for the declaration of a national policy, which he has been advo­
cating for many years, has met the same fate of Senator Stewart's bill a
 
hundred years earlier.
 
Since World War II the nation has supported, encouraged, and
 
fostered great technological advances in atomic energy, weapons, space,
 
and health. But little has been done about minerals problems. The budget
 
and sphere of activities of the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the principal
 
organization charged with national minerals responsibility, have remained
 
relatively static. The failure of the nation to give substantial support
 
to minerals technology continues as the economic problems posed by
 
minerals become increasingly critical.
 
A. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS FACING THE MINERALS SECTOR
 
The economic welfare of the nation is heavily dependent on keeping
 
the real cost of minerals and fuels on a declining curve. Attainment of
 
-12­
this objective is becoming increasingly difficult. The extraction,
 
processing, and utilization of minerals are becoming increasingly
 
costly. The rich and easily recoverable ores are already mined. We
 
must now mine deeper and look to more remote regions for our domestic
 
mineral resources. We are becoming increasingly reliant on foreign
 
sources of mineral supply. In addition, conservation and anti-pollution
 
measures and stricter health and safety standards in the mineral indus­
tries are adding to the cost of producing needed materials. Finally,
 
the production of trained manpower to attack the tangible problems is at
 
a low ebb. The educational lag leads inevitably to technological lags
 
and to a further deterioration of our minerals position.
 
A primary problem facing the minerals sector is the rapidly ac­
celerating demand for the mineral raw materials which form the basic
 
building blocks of our industrial economy. The extraction of minerals
 
accounts for only about three percent of the U. S. gross national product,
 
but these binerals represent the essential economic multipliers in in­
dustrial production comprising seventy-five percent of the gross national
 
product. In the past century, while U. S. population has grown 400
 
percent, minerals consumption has grown more than h,000 percent.6 Future
 
projections show continued rapid increase in minerals demand. For example,
 
we have indications of "1a tripling of requirements for both energy and
 
metals" by the year 2000.7 Figure 1 indicates the substantial nature of
 
the demand problem.
 
C6upled with increasing demand is the problem of decreasing sup­
plies of readily accessible and rich ores, deposits, and reservoirs. 
The easily recoverable minerals have long ago been recovered. 8 We are 
ENERGY METALS 
Quadrillion Btu million tons 
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300 300 
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100 	 100
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50 	 50
 
I I I 
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Figure 1. 	Growing U. S. Needs for Mineral Resources.
 
Source: 	 Hans H. Landsberg, Natural Resources for U. S. Growth: A Look
 
Ahead to the Year 2000 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
 
1Y96), p. 12.
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left with the necessity of utilizing lower grade resources. There is
 
no shortage of low grade resources, but their utilization implies the
 
possibility of increasing costs. Over the years, the application of
 
technology has resulted in declining real costs for minerals, despite
 
the accelerating demand and the need to utilize lower and lower grade
 
9
resources. How~ver, the declining curve for mineral costs is no longer
 
a fact, and we suspect in many commodities that the cost curve is be­
ginning to rise.10  The implications of rising costs are substantial,
 
affecting not only the minerals producers, but also the fabricators and
 
ultimately the consumers.
 
An additional problem in the economics of mineral resources is our
 
increasing reliance on imports for our critically needed materials. The
 
U. S., once a resource exporting nation, is now heavily a resource
 
importer. This is a result both of rising demand and declining domestic
 
production.11  Figure 2 illustrates the trend toward increasing imports,
 
and the trend is expected to accelerate rapidly in the future. Reliance
 
on foreign minerals has many implications including problems of security
 
of supply, dependence on others, unfavorable trade balances, declining
 
domestic industries, and the certainty that developing nations will one
 
day require their own minerals for their own uses.
 
Finally, a new national insistence on environmental protection is
 
affecting the economics of'the minerals sector. The effects are clearly
 
calculable in terms of costs. For example, the costs of minerals ex­
traction, processing, and utilization are increased if the air pollution
 
ingredients of coal must be removed as it is consumed to produce
 
electricity, if mine scarred lands must be restored for recreational
 
VALUE OF U. S. MINERAL IMPORTS AS PERCENT
 
OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
 
30 30
 
20 -20 
10 10 
0 
Figure 2. 
Source: 
I I I I1955 1960 1965 
Value of U. S. Mineral Imports as Percent of Domestic 
Production. 
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, National Mining and Minerals Policy, 91st Cong., 
1st Sess., 1969, p. 83. 
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use, and if solid waste must be disposed of rather than left lying
 
around in junk yards.
 
One answer to these problems lies in the application of advanced
 
technology to the minerals sector. The potential impact of technology
 
on fuels utilization, for example, is graphically illustrated in figure
 
3. The materials problems facing our society place six stringent de­
mands on technology. These are:
 
1. To foster new techniques of discovery.
 
2. To foster use of materials which so far evade our efforts.
 
3. To apply the principles of recycling more broadly.
 
4. To learn-how to deal with low concentrations of useful
 
materials.
 
5. To lessen or eliminate need for a scarce material by
 
substituting one that exists in greater abundance.
 
6. To develop and use more economically the resources that
 
are renewable in nature.1
2
 
Failure to meet these demands will inevitably result in material limi­
tations on our affluence. Landsberg states the policy implications
 
clearly:
 
At many points in this study the need for continued gains
 
in technology stands out clearly; without such advances the
 
ever-present tendencies for demand to outrun supply, save at
 
increased cost and prices, cannot be held in check. ..
 
Continued advance in techniques of exploration for ores and of
 
their extraction and processing, plus increased efficiency in
 
getting heat and power from fuels, will be necessary to
 
satisfy demands for mineral materials and energy. . . . The 
main escape hatch from scarcity is technological advance
 
across a broad front, and behind this have to be large,
 
varied, effective programs of research and development in
 
science engineering, economics, and management. And to back
 
up these efforts, in turn, there must be a strong system of
 
general education at all levels.13
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF TECHNOLOGY, 194O-196o 
NATURAL GAS 	 -- 2 034 
Billion cubic feet 	 3,110
 
COAL F7 208
 
lallion short tons 320
 
PETROLEUM 	 101
 
Million barrels 155
 
Estimate of fuel actually consumed.
 
Estimate of amounts that would have been needed at 1940
 
efficiency of fuel use -- without technological advance.
 
THE PROMISE OF TECHNOLOGY, 1960-2000
 
NATURAL GAS 	 0 
Billion cubic feet L4\ \h,800 
COAL _I 55
 
Million short tons hO0 

PETROLEUM 135
 
Million barrels a 18
 
Projected fuel requirements, assuming technological advance.
 
Projected fuel requirements at 1960 efficiency of fuel use -­
without technological advance. 
Figure 3. 	The Influence of Technological Advance on Fuel Requirements
 
for Generating Electricity.
 
Source: 	 Hans H. Landsberg, Natural Resources for U. S. Growth . A Look 
Ahead to the Year 2000 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
196), p. 	 28. 
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Landsberg's call for a strong system of education brings out 
another critical problem facing the minerals sector -- the decline of 
the minerals education establishment. In this day of scientific ac­
complishment, the effective supply of natural resources is clearly more 
dependent on knowledge and facilities than on the existence of high grade
 
deposits. But if technology is vitally needed, where will the expertise
 
come from? This question assumes critical dimensions when we consider
 
that in 1967 there were only seventeen educatidnal institutions which
 
had an accredited curriculum in mining engineering, and in 1969 only 110
 
mining engineers were graduated from American universities.lh Figure 4
 
illustrates the educational crisis in the minerals sector. In 1963, the
 
then Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Mineral Resources, John Kelly,
 
placed an eloquent statement of this problem in the official record:
 
The scarcity of creative people is one of the major forces
 
affecting the minerals industry today. The manpower pattern
 
developed in America of a working partnership between Government,
 
universities, and industry has somehow passed by the minerals
 
industry, particularly in the areas of exploration and develop­
ment. There is not a really sustained effort within the minerals
 
industry and the universities for basic research or for the
 
development of creative and knowledgeable people. In a period
 
when much has been done to take advantage of university resources
 
and talents, the schools of mines in America have been allowed to
 
languish. As a consequence, the minerals industry today i at a
 
disadvantage when competing in the market for creativity.
 
Six years later, the present Assistant Secretary for Mineral Resources,
 
Hollis Dole, testified to the same problems grown more acute by six
 
16
 
additional'years of neglect.

The absence of adequate public and private attention to the
 
problems of technology in the minerals sector over the past hundred years
 
has been remarkable. We are faced really with an almost pathological
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lack of national concern. We have had no shortage of experts, poli­
ticians, academicians, and industrial leaders who have viewed the
 
situation with alarm and who have sounded warnings. But nothing seems
 
to happen on a national policy level, in the private sector, or in the
 
academic world to start corrective actions. Federal mineral research
 
activities are poorly funded, states provide virtually nothing, and the
 
minerals industry, as we shall see below, is a niggardly supporter of
 
research and development. Nor have the universities responded to the
 
challenges by overhauling archaic curricula and upgrading their minerals
 
programs. There seems to be a national tendency to take mineral resources
 
for granted-- a kind of "gold rush" mentality which says that whatever
 
we need will be found in a rich stake justover the next hill. No amount
 
of warnings and alarms has served to mobilize sufficient action. What
 
is needed now is not another description of the problems but more concrete,
 
rational, aggressive proposals of institutions and programs to begin
 
meeting the obvious needs of society.
 
B. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITION OF THE MINERALS INDUSTRY
 
In our mixed economic system, the extraction, processing, and uti­
lization of minerals are primarily the functions and responsibilities of
 
the private sector operating in response to market conditions. Yet, the
 
larger public interest requires a steady, dependable supply of minerals
 
at reasonable social and economic cost in order to insure the health
 
and strength of the national economy. Furthermore, the environmental
 
effects, or external diseconomies, of minerals operations also require
 
the guardianship of the public interest. Nevertheless, the public
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interest notwithstanding, the principal and most direct beneficiary
 
of advanced technology is the competitive cost and profit position of
 
private industry. Under these circumstances we might expect that
 
private industry would bear the major burden of greatly expanded research
 
and development effort; however, such is not likely to be the case.
 
Certain basic characteristics of the minerals industry lead us to
 
expect that the private sector is unwilling or unable to support the
 
degree of expanded technological effort required by the conditions of
 
the general economy. The industrial structure in the minerals sector is
 
not conducive to expanded technological effort. Very generally speaking,
 
the minerals industries are characterized by a large number of relatively
 
small producing units, intensive competition, high risk, heavy explo­
ration and resource development costs, low and slow rates of return on
 
capital investment, inadequate cash flow income, depleting resources, and
 
vulnerability to loss of markets.1l Clearly, the industry needs research
 
and development; but the characteristics of the industry, and in particu­
lar its fragmentation, seriously inhibit substantial research and develop­
ment investment.
 
The minerals industry, in fact, is not research intensive. The 
latest data compiled by the National Science Foundation show that the 
petroleum and primary metals industries, as shown in figure 5, rank well 
below the national average of funds spent for research and development 
as a percentage of net sales. Evaluation of research activity by the 
criterion of number of scientists and engineers per 1,000 -employees also
 
shows these industries to be well below the average of all industries.1 8
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While improved technology has been highly significant in enabling
 
the minerals industry to meet extraordinary demand growth in the past
 
century, the advances have largely been incremental improvements in
 
equipment and materials-handling techniques and in the full utilization
 
of older process improvemdnts. The technology of the past will no longer
 
suffice to meet the changing needs of our time. We now need a substantial
 
new research base from which future improvements can be made. In the
 
words of the Paley Commission eighteen years ago: "We shall have to in­
crease the over-all effort of materials technology, and plan its whole
 
pattern of research better than it has ever been planned before.'19
 
The prospects of the required level of technological effort coming
 
from the industry are remote. The structural nature of the industry is
 
against it. The lack of research intensity and capahity within the
 
industry is against it. Some fundamental conditions of economics in
 
relationship to technology are against it. Economic analysis has-tended
 
to show that the market works very imperfectly in regard to the advance­
ment of technology and that, as one close student of the relationship
 
reports, "there are good reasons to believe that market incentives tend
 
to cause business firms to spend much less than is socially desirable on
 
20 
research ahd experimental development.", If this is true of industry
 
in general, it is particularly true of the minerals industry. We find
 
some level of research expenditure in the petroleum industry; less in
 
coal; and essentially none in primary metals, fabricated metals, and
 
21
 
mining.
 
To add to the problem, the present major concerns of leaders in
 
the minerals industry seem to be matters other than technology. The
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common posture of the industry leans to concerns of special governmental
 
favors and privileges, depletion tax policies, tariff protection, and
 
subsidies, rather than advancement of technology.22 A review of the
 
statements of industrial leaders to the Senate Subcommittee on Minerals,.
 
Materials, and Fuels in 1969 reveals overriding concern with the above
 
matters, and little comment on the need for improved technology.23
 
These are, after all, mature industries which have been operating for a
 
long time in accustomed ways. We perhaps should not expect great bursts
 
of technological innovation.
 
Those industries which are research intensive are characterized by
 
large size of producing units, a structural and behavioral framework of
 
oligopoly, accumulation of uncommitted surpluses of capital, an ability
 
to absorb uncertainty and high risk, opportunity for profitable invest­
ment in research, and heavy governmental support.24 In 1967 companies in
 
five industries reported eighty-four percent of all industrial research
 
and development expenditures. The two leading industry groups in
 
research and development expenditures (aircraft and missiles, 34%; and
 
electrical equipment and communications, 23%) held their lead "primarily
 
because of substantial Federal Government financing of their activities. 25
 
The minerals industry meets none of the conditions of size,
 
structure, or support which characterize r~search intensive industries.
 
The Paley Commissioh summarized the situation very well:
 
Thus, industry ordinarily undertakes materials research only
 
when hard pressed -- that is, only after,a crisis is already iell
 
developed. Individual companies have understandably only a limited
 
interest in long-range research on problems whereby, if successful,
 
they pay the bill for their competitors. On the other hand, the
 
vigorous and resourceful attack necessary to anticipate impending
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materials difficulties gually has not been forthcoming
 
from Goverrnment either.
 
The reference to the role of government opens up a new area of
 
discussion. If the minerals industry finds the costs of long-range
 
research to be more than it can accommodate, particularly when the chance
 
of large success is remote, it may then either reduce its expenditures or
 
ask for government support.27 The latter course has generally been
 
followed, and we have the justification for and continued existence of
 
intra-mural governmental research efforts in mineral resources. The
 
rationale for these programs is well expressed by an industrial research
 
leader:
 
Those few federal research projects which have to do with
 
the application of fundamental scientific facts in order to
 
maintain the welfare of the public at a distant time are usually
 
connected with the depreciation of our natural resources. These
 
are problems that cannot be justified by industry from the
 
stockholders standpoint, not only because of the high cost, but
 
also on account-of the long time necessary for solution. The
 
need for this research is always apparent, and it is this type
 
of research that is asked for by industry.28
 
C. THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN MINERALS TECHNOLOGY
 
Governments have traditionally been concerned to some degree with
 
the supply and utilization of vital mineral products. One authority
 
traces the governmental role back to the early limits of human history:
 
"Goverment aid, regulation and participation in the mineral industry are
 
not new; they date back to the time when man first adopted communal
 
living."29 In the American society, the governmental role is expressed
 
in terms of stewardship, which implies management, conservation, and
 
development of mineral resources. But this concept runs immediately into
 
the problem of how a government can manage, conserve, and develop
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resources which are largely in the hands of private owners, produced
 
and consumed in response to market conditions, and subject to the
 
influence of private stockholders.
 
Even in a free enterprise economy, some relationship is necessary
 
between government and the mineral industry, because minerals have a
 
public utility as well as private property aspect. This is .demonstrated
 
in the requirements of national defense for critical materials. Also,
 
the health of the total economy and environmental considerations offer
 
compelling reasons for the relationship.30 Under these circumstances,
 
the governmental role is-one of regulation of the diseconomies of
 
minerals production and utilization, assistance and Jsubsidy in the form
 
of tax and tariff measures, analysis and information for policy decisions, 
and technological assistance. Technological assistance to the minerals 
industry has a substantial tradition in the United States. For example, 
the Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey have provided excellent 
services for so long that they have been largely taken for granted by 
the industry.
31 
In general, governmental support of research and development for
 
the private sector has three main justifications. Support is justified
 
in programs where rapid rates of technological advance are required and
 
where the public interest transcends private incentives, as in health
 
and aviation. Support is justified in industries like agriculture where
 
the conditions of the industry result in weak capabilities for research
 
and development. And support is justified in basic activities such as
 
basic research and education.32 A case can be made for governmental
 
support of minerals technology in all three areas.
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Minerals research and development of ultimate benefit to the
 
private sector is carried on primarily in the laboratories of the
 
Geological Survey, National Bureau of Standards, and the Bureau of
 
Mines. The Geological Survey efforts are directed at exploration and
 
appraisal of resources. The National Bureau of Standards is concerned
 
with the fundamental properties of materials. The Bureau of Mines con­
ducts research programs specifically intended "to stimulate industrial
 
production, processing, and use of essential minerals and fuels in ways
 
that are socially and economically beneficial to the United States."33
 
These research programs are in the areas of mining methods, metallurgy,
 
coal, petroleum, explosives, and health'and safety.
 
The activities of government agencies are directed, in the words
 
of a former Director of the Bureau of Mines, "at promoting the wise
 
development and use of the nation's mineral resources to sustain the
 
economy and to assure adequate, dependable supplies at the lowest eco­
nomic and social cost.04 But the governmental efforts are poorly co­
ordinated, fragmented, and of too small a scale to properly meet the re­
quirements of the general economy. There is no national minerals policy,
 
only a collection of unrelated laws and activities.35 We have noted
 
Senator Allott's attempt over a ten year period to have Congress declare
 
a national minerals policy, without avail.
36
 
The lack of national policy is joined by inadequate coordination
 
within the government. The situation has not appreciably improved since
 
the Paley Commission wrote:
 
In spite of the number of Federal projects and of the
 
considerable body of coordinating machinery, many problems in
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materials technology still fall into a no-man's land. These 
are in areas of insufficient immediate interest to industry that 
-- except in emergencies -- are either overlooked by Government 
agencies or handled with little attention to the many related 
questions usually involved. . . . There is clear need for 
greater coordination of material technology, not only to avoid 
gaps, overlaps and collisions among Federal policies and 
programs, but also to orient and fpter the entire national 
effort, private as well as public.4e 
Obviously the conditions in the minerals industry, minerals education, 
and government require substantial alteration if the challenges and require­
ments of adequate mineral resources for the nation are to be met. On many 
occasions the government has been exhorted, often by its own officials. to 
pull overything together, to mobilize all the minerals interests into 
some kind of partnership of government, industry, and universities. We 
cannot help but wonder if a partnership of the thre parties, in their 
present condition, would really achieve the required solutions. 
Any realistic partnership must recognize and overcome the limi­
tations of the partners. The first requirement of an effective partner­
ship is for government to put its own house in order by deciding on 
objectives and policies of governmental action in the minerals sector. 
A second requirement is to bring about a strengthening of the research 
capacity in private industry. This can be done only through a commitment 
of resources, both from industry and government, to the achievement of 
technological objectives. It is perhaps no accident that those industries 
which are research intensive are also those which are heavily involved in 
programs underwritten by the government. A third requirement is for the 
remaining minerals education establishments to overhaul and vitalize 
their curricula and, again with governmental support, to expand their 
research and educational activities in the minerals area.
 
-29-

Assuming that achievement of the above requirements is desirable
 
in the national interest, we may well ask what institutional mechanisms
 
would be most effective. Finding a tentative answer to this question
 
is the concern of the following chapters.
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CHAPTER III 
IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
AND THE NEED FOR CRITERIA 
As the problems facing the minerals sector of our economy threaten
 
to drive up the cost of essential materials, the application of knowledge
 
and technology through research and development represents a fundamental
 
approach to problem solution. This approach raises additional problems
 
of planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale technological
 
programs in an industry which is characterized by individualism,
 
fragmentation, pursuit of self-interest, and a relatively low level of
 
research effort. If the need is evident, generally accepted and testi­
fied to by arrays of experts, what then is required in the way of
 
policies, programs, and institutions to attack the problems? For
 
guidance in this, we need to look closely at the methods and programs
 
of agencies which have successfully mobilized the required resources to
 
deal with substantial technological challenges. Specifically, in terms
 
of this study, how can science and technology be marshalled most ef­
fectively to meet the challenges of our minerals economy?
 
The basic questions facing science and technology today are the
 
same basic questions that face any economic endeavor: What shall be
 
produced? How shall it be produced, by whom, and with what resources?
 
And for whom shall it be produced and how shall it be distributed?1 In
 
regard to science, the first question has been explored by many students
 
of public science policy. The classic statement, leading to a dis­
cussion of criteria for scientific choice, was issued by Alvin Weinberg:
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It seems inevitable that the demands of science will
 
eventually be limited by what society can allocate to
 
science. We shall have to choose among different, often
 
incommensurable fields of science -- between high-energy

physics and oceanography or between molecular biology.and
 
material science. We shall also have to choose among the
 
different institutions 
-- universities, government labo­
ratories, aid industry -- that receive government support
 
for science. The first choice Icall scientific choice;
 
the second, institutional choice.2
 
Weinberg has discussed in detail his proposals for criteria for
 
scientific choice. He has been joined in the discussion by a dis­
tinguished roster of other well known scientists.3 These authors,
 
however, have virtually ignored the question of institutional choice.
 
We are left with little guidance for answers to the second fundamental
 
economic question regarding the institutional methods for the performance
 
of scientific and technological inquiry. It is this second question
 
which is the concern of this chapter.
 
How the work of science is done, and by whom, is certainly as im­
portant as what is done. One conditions the other ih a reciprocal re­
lationship. In political and social terms, who does the work and under
 
what circumstances is highly significant. Many observers have noted the
 
instrumental effect that government research and development programs
 
have had on the intermingling and interweaving of the public and private
 
sectors of our society. When we inquire into the institutional reasons
 
for why and how this has happened. we do not find answers; we find only
 
justifications. Yet, the past must guide us as we plan technological
 
programs for solutions to critical social problems.
 
The purpose of this chapter and the following chapter is to look
 
at the past practice of institutional arrangements for science and
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technology in the public sector. We intend to assess the implications
 
of past practice and to derive criteria for future institutional choice.
 
The identified criteria will then serve as reference points in the
 
development of institutional recommendations for the conduct of minerals
 
research and development programs.
 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
 
Since 1940, the managers of federal science programs have utilized 
a bewildering array of institutional arrangements for the conduct of 
public research and development programs. For thirty years, the ob­
jectives of technological effort were fairly clear, although they are 
now being called into question. But if the objectives were reasonably 
clear, the institutional pathways to achievement of the objectives were
 
exceedingly complex, involved, and inconsistent. A recent analysis of
 
U. S. science policy states: "...the Federal agencies have adopted the
 
structures most appropriate to their respective missions. This special­
ization, moreover, meets the wishes of the Executive Office whose main
 
concern is the achievement of the great priority goals."4 As we have
 
fashioned research and development institutions for 'public program ac­
complishment, we have fastened our sights on the ends of technological
 
policy and have allowed the institutional means to be bent to the ends.
 
This is contrary to the predilection of the American political system
 
for means rather than ends. This is also fundamentally contrary to the
 
value system of science which extols means and distrusts ends.5 Further­
more, the choice of institutional methods used to accomplish technological
 
objectives has had profound, unexpected consequences for the American
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society. As we have allocated eighty percent of our federal government
 
expenditures for research and development to non-federal organizations,
 
we.have effectively changed the'American political and economic system.
 
The most striking implication of the last thirty years of federal
 
science management has been the blurring of the lines between public and
 
private enterprise. Perhaps the most coherent and incisive description
 
of this latter day commingling of public and private affairs is contained
 
in John Kenneth Galbraith's The New Industrial State; Galbraith looks
 
at government-business interaction and reports: "The industrial system,
 
in fact, is inextricably associated with the state. In notable respects
 
the mature corporation is an arm of the state. And the state, in im­
'6
portant matters, is an instrument of the industrial system. Galbraith
 
views this as the central trend in American economic and political life,
 
and he hplds the dynamics of advanced technology as± principally re­
sponsible. Apparently then, one unanticipated consequence of massive
 
federal support of science and technology since 19h0 has been the re­
casting of American society.7
 
The rapidly advancing complexity and increasing cost of tech­
nology, particularly atomic energy, space exploration, and modern
 
weaponry, have thoroughly intertwined public and private interests.
 
This is especially true in the space program where the interrelationships
 
between NASA and its contractors have been recently described in Fortune
 
magazine as a "new sociology."8 As in the space program, so even earlier
 
in the atomic energy program:
 
"The atomic statute (Atomic Energy Act of 1954) appears
 
to represent the culmination of the blurring process that has
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been taking place in recent years between private and
 
public areas of our economy. The forces operating on
 
competitive private industry ... have taken on many of
 
the characteristics gf those forces affecting a govern­
mental undertaking.")
 
Nor is it just government agencies and industry that have gotten inter­
mingled. Our universities are deeply involved, and a whole array of
 
non-profit institutions of one kind or another are inextricably associated
 
with planning as well as conducting government programs.
 
In effect, since 1940, the government has choden on pragmatic and
 
expedient grounds to develop a partnership with the private sector. This
 
partnership has been officially sanctioned by the Bureau of the Budget in
 
the well known Bell Report: "A partnership among public and private
 
agencies is the best way in our society to enlist the Nation's resources
 
and achieve the most rapid progress."lO With this official statement in
 
mind, the dominant practice of the federal government since 1940 has been
 
to place increasing emphasis on non-federal institutions for the conduct
 
of federal research and development programs l1 During these years, the
 
ideological issues and the principles of public versus private enterprise
 
12
were not faced directly by government science policy makers.
 
The results of institutional expediency, pragmatism, and the bending
 
of means to ends has yet to-be reckoned. Don Price has pointed out: "No
 
one seemed to be very surprised when ... the postwar atomic energy and
 
space programs were built on a system that was not an extended bureaucracy
 
13 
but a network of contracts with private institutions." But if no one
 
was surprised, then no one really faced the issues. Nor have we yet made
 
explicit the institutional philosophy or political science concepts which
 
tie government science and industry so intimately together.1l Michael
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Reagan continues to prod us in the direction of facing the issues when
 
he writes:
 
"The practical administrator usually only asks of a 
system or a process: Does it work? If it does, he is
 
satisfied. We, on the outside, however, should also be
 
asking: What does that particular process do to our
 
system? Is it harmful or beneficial i its side effects,
 
in the long as well as the short run?"15 
Peter Drucker views the accelerating public-private partnership
 
16 
with alarm and concern for the fate of the individual. Others are 
more sanguine. Clarence Danhof summarizes: "Given the nature of the 
R & D process, this intermingling is essential to the system. ... An 
agency's program is built upon contributions from mqny sources."1 7 
Alvin Weinberg is even more relaxed: "This trend toward blurring of our 
institutions by each taking over historic functions of a related insti­
tution is very common today. In industry, it is called diversifiation. " 1 8 
Weinberg is echoed by Don Price who points out that the relationship 
between government and its research and development contractors "is more 
like the administrative relationship between an industrial corporation
 
and its subsidiary than the traditional relationship of buyer and seller
 
1 9 
in a free market." 

Despite such reassurances, we have every reason to become .concerned
 
over the intermingling of public and private institutions in the conduct
 
of the public's business, for this strikes directly at the concept of
 
responsibility and accountability of government. One cause for concern 
is that the private sector may become dominant in the partnership, to 
20the detriment of the public interest. The reverse aspect of this
 
danger is "that government by procurement, unregulated, can be as
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dangerous to the free enterprise system as any other form of rule not
 
responsive to the electorate."21 If the partnership is equally dangerous
 
to both partners, we may take some comfort in the hope that a balance of
 
power will prevent undue advantage to either party.
 
We can take little comfort in resorting to the law. There are
 
serious constitutional uncertainties in the process of the Federal govern­
ment contracting-out its responsibilities to private parties, and legal
 
.theory "must be rather severely wrenched to assimilate such a major
 
deviation from orthodoxy."2 2 Nonetheless, the strengths of the partner­
ship will keep it in business. We must be aware, however, and design
 
our institutions carefully, for as Arthur Miller states: "Democratic
 
government is responsible government -- which means accountable -govern­
ment -- and the essential problem in contracting-out is that responsi­
bility and accountability are greatly diminished."2
 
In democratic political theory, there is another side to the re­
sponsibility-accountability coin. If institutions are commingled, we
 
have the elements of representation and participation of a broad public
 
sector in public programs and decisions. The concepts of representation
 
and participation are very much in the mainstream of the theory and
 
practice of democratic government. Another word for it would be
 
pluralism. There is no question that the recent development and oper­
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ation of American science policy has been pluralistic. Sanford Lakoff
 
has put it very well:
 
"In short, if we consider only this one sector of the
 
scientific establishment, the public sector, we see a
 
structure made up largely of horizontally parallel rather
 
than vertically integrated segments. The scientific es­
tablishment in the government is hardly monolithic or
 
-ho­
.regimented. It too is distinctly pluralistic.
 
What we are really talking about here is the influence of insti­
tutional patterns of research and development on the gestation of a new
 
Federalism. Don Price described and defined it as "Federalism by
 
Contract" in 1962: "And now, in the research and development programs,
 
the scientists have brought to its most complete development an impro­
vised system of federalism that makes use of private institutions for
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the conduct of federal programs." The New Federalism seems to be a
 
non-partisan issue. In 1967, President Johnson charged a study com­
mission to investigate the best techniques for public and private
 
collaboration.27 In 1970, President Nixon has called for a New Feder­
alism which will return power to the people.28
 
The New Federalism can have unhappy connotations. If we mean by
 
it a great giveaway of federal funds and an abandonment of federal policy
 
sd program responsibilities, the implications are disastrous.29 On
 
another front, if the New Federalism means a closed system which is oper­
ated by and for the convenience of its governmental and contractor­
subsidiary components, then we must be greatly concerned over the repre­
sentation of the larger public interest and for the interest of the
 
individual citizen-consumer-taxpayer. Galbraith's version of the in­
dustrial state implies a closed system, a fusion of economic and politi­
cal power. A sense of the threat of such a closed system perhaps pro­
vides the motivation for the general publiclsturning away from tech­
nology and the rationalism of science, and a popular turning to a new
 
romanticism and a search for new values.
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If the foregoing implications are to be avoided, the mixture of 
politics and technology now places new demands on policy makers. As 
James McCamy puts it: "The new politicians have to blend public de­
cision and private execution ... They have to maintain the new mixture 
of public and private enterprise without allowing the state to become 
totalitarian."3 0 If this can be accomplished, then the New Federalism 
takes on the meaning of a new and broader public participation in 
government policies, decisions, and programs. 
The direction which the New Federalism will take is a critical
 
issue which planners and managers of national research and development
 
programs must take into account. We must begin to face the political,
 
social, and economic implications of institutional choice. These are
 
considerations which must be emphasized in the design of institutional
 
arrangements for the accomplishment of national technological objectives.
 
We can do this by recognizing the issues and'by devising institutional
 
mechanisms which reflect our concern.
 
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRAY
 
The menu of possible institutional arrangements for the accomplish­
ment of research and development is lengthy, complex, and like that
 
found in any fine restaurant, undoubtedly expensive. For example, in
 
fiscal year 1968 the federal bill for research and development was 16.7
 
billion dollars, of which 13.1 billion was allocated to a variety of
 
extra-mural operations, with the balance going to in-house activities.
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We are concerned here with the basis of choice between intra- and extra­
mural operations, contracts with private profit-making firms, grants for
 
university research, quasi-government laboratories, RAND-like organi­
zations, COMSAT-like enterprise, and an array of intervening possi­
bilities'and combinations. In a recent essay, Norton Long discusses 
policy choices regarding the allocation of resources between levels,of.
 
government and between the public and private sectors. 
He holds that
 
the choices "depend on the outcomes we value and the most effective mix
 
"
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of . . . initiatives for producing the desired outcome.
 To date,
 
effectiveness has been the principal concern, and significant political,
 
social, and economic outcomes have not been given due consideration.
 
The institutional possibilities have all been used in varying
 
combinations by different agencies with varying degrees of success. 
We
 
find no.consistency. The Atomic Energy Commission relies almost ex­
clusively on extra-mural operations; NASA maintains some intra-mural
 
capacity but relies principally on contracts and grants; NIH has strong
 
in-house capacity but also places heavy reliance on the educational and
 
non-profit sectors; 
the National Bureau of Standards operates predominantly
 
in-house. Each of these agencies has been remarkably successful. Each
 
has also had problems.
 
Analysis of the contribution of organizational style to success or
 
failure of technological programs would be an important study. Dwight
 
Waldo called for such a study nine years ago: "If our future depends upon
 
the effectiveness of our research effort, then it would seem to follow
 
that one of the first things we need to research is the effectiveness of
 
different styles of research organization and operation."3 3 Measuring
 
the effectiveness of research organizations is a knotty problem,as at­
tested to by James McCamy:
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"After twenty years of large-scale administration
 
by contract, we still cannot measure results against
 
what might have been accomplished by government doing all
 
the work in its own agencies, with its own people. We
 
face the old familiar lack of a yardstick to measure
 
social results in the accomplishment of public admin­
istration, before and after. ... The more important
 
results can be measured only by judgment. To measure the
 
achievement of government when it does its own research
 
compared to when it contracts for research is as different
 
as to measure eacation. It can be done, but the results
 
make no sense.
 
Our interest here is not to contend with these difficult questions but
 
rather to look farther back and to seek the implications of decisions
 
to organize and operate in one way or, another.
 
For purposes of further discussion and analysis, eight insti­
tutional alternatives are identified and defined in the following pages.
 
Obviously, these eight alternatives do not exhaust the examples of past
 
and present practice, nor do they blanket future possibilities. They
 
are merely representative of the institutional mechanisms which are
 
commonly utilized in the conduct of federal research programs.
 
1. National Laboratories. These include government-owned and
 
controlled activities and installations, either operated by government
 
personnel or by contractor personnel for the government. The federal
 
government spent approximately 3.5 billion dollars on directly operated
 
in-house laboratory facilities in fiscal year 1968.35 Although the 
largest federal technological program areas -- defense, space, atomic 
energy, and health -- are heavily committed to extra-mural operations, 
the responsible agencies maintain significant in-house capability. The 
domestic research and development programs in natural resources, agri­
culture, and commerce are largely in-house oriented. 
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Under National Laboratories, we are also including government
 
facilities which are contractor operated. The use of contracts to
 
establish and operate government-owned and funded facilities, which
 
prior to World War II would have been intra-mural, is characteristic
 
of atomic energy research operations. The Defense Department and NASA
 
also make limited use of this concept. There were 58 facilities in
 
operation in 196h. These facilities are managed by private institutions
 
or universities under contracts of marked continuity. They are closely
 
identified with a single agency and have responsibilities directly tied
 
to the mission or program of the sponsor. Examples of contractor­
operated government facilities are the Los Alamos Research Laboratory
 
and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory of the AEC, and the Jet Propulsion
 
Laboratory of NASA.
 
2. Industrial Contractor Facilities. These include government
 
research and development activities which are performed in the profit
 
sector of the economy. The significance of this activity is represented
 
by Department of Defense calculations that in fiscal year 1968 contracts
 
with industrial firms for research and development represented 68 percent
 
of the total defense technological performance.36 Research and develop­
ment contracting with the private sector involves products which range
 
from theoretical development to actual production of hardware and services.
 
One major feature of this activity is described by Michael Reagan:
 
"R&D contracts cannot be let by competitive bidding,
 
and major contractors often become permanent dependents of
 
the government -- which thus becomes reciprocally dependent
 
on a small number of major firms. Most of the normal market
 
protections are therefore unavailable; a contracting officer
 
rides herd on the performance as a surrogate for the missifig
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competitive element."3 7
 
3. University and Non-Profit Organization Facilities. Federal
 
funding of university research is characterized by projects in academic
 
departments following the interests of the scientific community. 38 
 The
 
principal funding device is the grant either to the educational insti­
tution or more commonly to individual researchers and teams. Research
 
and development in non-profit institutions covers a lbroad range of
 
projects and scope of operation. At one end, projects may be academically
 
oriented at one of fourteen major not-for-profit institutions such as the
 
Batelle Memorial Institute, Mellon Institute, or the Stanford Research
 
Institute, nearly half of which have a university affiliation.39 
In
 
contrast, non-profit institutions such as Sandia Laboratories, which is
 
operated as a non-profit subsidiary of the Bell System, perform major
 
design, development, testing, and production monitoring of nuclear com­
ponents and systems for the AEC.h0 Major agency supporters of university
 
and non-profit research activities are NASA, Department of Defense, AEC,
 
National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation.
 
4. University Consortiums. In cases where the public programs
 
are of wide scientific interest and broad scope, several universities may
 
join together to provide facilities for federally supported research.
 
One example is the National Center for Atmospheric Research, (NCAR),
 
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, and operated by a private
 
corporation consisting of 27 universities from all parts of the country.
 
Another example is the Virginia Associated Research Center (VARC) which
 
was established as result of an agreement between NASA and the Common­
wealth of Virginia. The VARC is a cooperative venture of the College of
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William and Mary, University of Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Insti­
tute, and the Medical College of Virginia. The Center manages NASA's
 
Space Radiation Effects Laboratory and operates programs in which
 
graduate students and representatives of other institutions can par­
ticipate.Jl
 
5. University-Government Cooperative Enterprise. This arrange­
ment implies a joint'venture between a university and a government,
 
agency to establish, maintain, and operate a research installation for
 
projects of mutual interest. The clearest example of this arrangement
 
is the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics (JILA), established
 
by partnership between the University of Colorado and the National
 
Bureau of Standards. In the JILA, federal and university personnel are
 
virtually indistinguishable as they work together, share facilities, and
 
participate in university functions. One result of this arrangement is
 
that "the Government side of the operation is relatively unhampered by
 
the usual problems relating to the adequacy of ceilings and logistical
 
support services."4
2
 
6. Bridging Institutions between Universities and Government.
 
Relationships between government and universities have been subjected to
 
two contrasting criticisms. One points to the need for greater inter­
action. The other views with alarm the impact which massive federal
 
support of university research is having on the structure, mission, and
 
effectiveness of academic institutions. These criticisms have led to
 
the establishment of bridging pr buffer institutions to stand between
 
government and academia. A leading example of this kind of institution
 
is the Lunar Science Institute (LSI) which was established in 1968.
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The LSI is funded by NASA. but established by the National Academy of 
Sciences with the cooperation of a group of universities. The principal 
function of the LSI is to insure the interaction between university 
scientists, staff scientists of the Manned Spacecraft Center, and the
 
Institute's own staff and visiting scientists. Thus, LSI has become
 
a kind of "academic way station" between NASA and the academic com­
munty.
 
7. RAND-Type Institutions. The years following World War II have
 
seen the remarkable leap to prominence of a new kind of non-profit organi­
zation which specializes in systems research and development, program
 
analysis, and, most controversially, policy advice to government agencies.
 
The prototype of this form is the RAND Corporation. But RAND is not
 
alone in a-field now crowded with many others including the Institute
 
for Defense Analysis, Center for Naval Analysis, Research Analysis
 
Corporation, and the Systems Development Corporation. It has been sug­
gested by some that this,form of institution should be fostered and
 
encouraged as an effective means of obtaining quality analysis and advice.
 
Many agencies in the civilian sector are now utilizing such institutions,
 
and RAND itself is looking far beyond its original emphasis on national
 
defense, intelligence, and security. These institutions have also been
 
viewed from other quarters as threats to government accountability and
 
responsibility because their influence on policy is not subject to the
 
view or, control of the people.
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8. Public/Private Corporations. In 1962, Congress passed and the
 
President signed the Communications Satellite Act establishing a corpo­
ration which is a blend of public and private enterprise for the purpose
 
of carrying out an important technological program. The result is
 
COMSAT, a private firm which issues common stock under a congressionally
 
prescribed methodj and which has three of its fifteen directors ap­
pointed by the President of the United States. One reviewer of this 
remarkable corporation states: "COMSAT is an experiment, a social 
experiment, ... to see whether new forms can be developed that will 
transcend the obsolete notion of society as a competition between the 
individual and the state.iiA6 COMSAT may well represent the ultimate in 
the intermingling of public and private interests in the accomplishment 
of technological effort in the national interest. 
C. THE NEED FOR CRITERIA 
A search of available literature indicates that no adequate
 
standard criteria for institutional'choice have been developed.
 
Weinberg indicates that such criteria exist, but he does not elaborate.47
 
Here and there we do find evidence of management considerations, admin­
istrative factors, reasons, and justifications for choice; but we are
 
not easily able to determine the criteria which, for example, moved the
 
AEC to contract-out the science and technology for atomic energy and yet,
 
in effect, to create a network of national laboratories which are to all
 
intents, purposes, and appearances as in-house as any Bureau of Mines
 
research facility.4 8
 
In his excellent review of the literature of scientific choice,
 
Bruce Smith initiates a discussion of institutional choice, but he does
 
not follow through beyond stating: "For many important questions of
 
scientific choice ultimately boil down toquestions of institutional
 
choice."49 Smith then abandons the search, but he does lead us to
 
Carl Kaysen's substantial discussion on the subject:
 
Kaysen appears to go farthest in the direction
 
of stressing the means of reaching decisions on science
 
policy. If we can devise the appropriate administrative
 
machinery, which will provide both deliberate and in
 
some sense representative choices, then many of the
 
substantive issues of science policy will be resolved
 
as a matter of course. ... Kaysen sees the search for
 
appropriate administrative mechanisms as a more promising
 
approach to the allocation of scientific resources than
 
the inventing of new allocation formula. 5 0
 
Congress has begun to express some interest in institutional
 
criteria. In 1968, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics
 
asked Harold Finger of NASA: "What criteria are there to determine if
 
NASA should perform work in-house, contract to industry or universities,
 
or have the work performed by another government agency?" He replied:
 
The question of what criteria are used by NASA-to
 
determine whether NASA should perform work in-house,
 
by contract, by universities, or by another government
 
agency really depends on a set of complex management
 
factors which must be appraised on a case-by-case basis.
 
There is no set of criteria which are followed in every
 
instance. There are, however, several general policies
 
which NASA follows as a basis for decision-making.
 
Finger went on to refer to policies of NASA and the Executive Branch and
 
to the necessity of maintaining in-house competence. He then suggested
 
nine "management considerations," but at no time did he refer to the
 
fundamental issues of the relationship of institutional choice to po­
litical, economic, and social relationships.51
 
The same committee asked a similar question of Phillip S. Hughes
 
.of the Bureau of the Budget. His reply contained a clear statement of
 
guidelines, if not criteria, by summarizing the contents of Bureau
 
Circulars A-49 and A-:16 and the Bell Report.5 2 This statement is
 
indicative of the best government thinking to date on this subject and
 
is therefore quoted at some length:
 
In our judgment there are two principal alternatives
 
for accomplishing the Government's R&D work. Either existing
 
or new in-house facilities must be used or arrangements must
 
be made to perform the needed R&D by contract or grant with
 
industrial, educational, State or local governmental and
 
not-for-profit organizations. ...
 
Precise criteria for choosing among alternatives are at
 
best difficult to develop, but there are a number of guide­
lines which an agency can consider in making its choices.
 
For example, BOB Circular A-h9 requires each agency to es­
tablish criteria for the use of management and operating
 
contracts and suggests guidelines for such criteria. The
 
Bell Report of 1962 discussed the natural advantages of di­
rect Federal operations and the various patterns of contracting
 
now in use and included the following general guideline for
 
choosing among alternatives which we believe is still valid:
 
. Not all arrangements, however, are equally suit­
able for all purposes and under all circumstances, and dis­
criminating choices must be made among them by the Government
 
agencies having research and development responsibilities.
 
These choices should be based primarily on two considerations:
 
"(1) Getting the job done effectively and efficiently,
 
with due regard to the long-term strength of the Nation's
 
scientific and technical resources; and
 
"(2) Avoiding assignments of work which would create
 
inherent conflicts of interest."
 
Wit respec; o t;e'factor of cost,"BOBCircular A-76 
provides guidance for agencies to decide among alternatives 
on the basis of cost comparisons. However, . . . program 
requirements and management considerations are the most 
compelling.determinants for choosing alternatives in the
 
research and development area.
 
The need for criteria has been expressed both by administrators
 
and scientists. James E. Webb states the need eloquently:
 
There is no doubt that we have the technical tools to
 
free our society of many of its burdens and to carry it to
 
new levels of achievement. What we need is an operating
 
concept that requires us to find ways to use these tools
 
deliberately and purposively to reform our society and to
 
ensure continuing progress toward the great goals we set
 
for ourselves long ago.
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Webb also remains alert to the implications of organizational choice
 
when he raises the question of our ability to "organize ourselves to
 
achieve effectiveness and efficiency in ever larger and more complex
 
'
and taxing jobs and still retain our democratic ways. Sh
 
On a more practical plane, Elmer Staats points out the signifi­
cance of institutional choice criteria: 
 "One of our chronic and very
 
difficult, problems has been to maintain some balance between in-house
 
and extramural research ... But we still don't have a clear picture
 
of when it is best to undertake in-house and when it is best to under­
take it by grants or contracts."55 And William D. Carey believes that
 
"the great remaining question is how government, the scientific com­
innity and industry will find common ground in stipulating the substance
 
and priorities of these [science and technolog7 goals and strategies."56
 
The view of the scientist is even more practical. As Dr. James R.
 
Killian, Jr., told a Conference on Research and Development and Its
 
Impact on the Economy: 'Weneed to find ... new institutional patterns
 
and relationships to provide research facilities adequate to deal with
 
modern research techniques."5 7 Already we can see that institutional
 
criteria must include considerations of values, objectives, administration
 
and management, and the process and techniques of research and develop­
ment. 
It is also clear that technological policy-making has suffered
 
from the lack of criteria.58
 
The federal government is notably ambivalent toward the confused
 
state of institutional criteria. The government bewails the absence of
 
criteria; it is responsible for the confusion; and it excuses the con­
fusion as a matter virtually of official policy. For examle. William
 
12­
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Carey states the official complaint clearly:
 
Meantime, the executive branch ought to decide what
 
it wants to do about grants versus contracts, university
 
cost participation in research, indirect expense allowances,
 
inconsistencies in administrative controls, in-house versus
 
contract research, the future of national §boratories, and
 
over concentration of university research.
 
On the other hand, the government causes the confusion through
 
its predominant role as funder but not operator of technological

6o 
programs. And the government excuses its own confusion, as in the
 
Bell Report:
 
We consider it necessary and desirable to use a
 
variety of arrangements to obtain the scientific and techni­
cal services needed to accomplish public purposes. ... Each
 
agency should be encouraged to sgjk new and better arrange­
ments to accomplish its purpose.
 
More recently, Robert H. Kreidler speaks for the President's science
 
advisers when he says:
 
No single, easy, administrative policy can take account of
 
the diverse objectives of all federal agencies and the varied
 
interests of all private institutions in financing research
 
facilities. The President's science advisers 'musttry to be
 
resourceful and wise in conceiving new polic s for equipping
 
science with the tools of scientific advice.
 
Unfortunately, an exhortation to be resourceful and wise is not an
 
adequate basis for institutional decisions. Kreidler's statement perhaps
 
reflects a condition surrouiding institutional choice which Michael
 
Reagan has described for scientific choice as a "wistful longing for
 
the 'good old days' of 1950-64 when competing claims were handled by in­
creasing funds sufficiently to satisfy all claimants simultaneously." 63
 
In institutional terms, the "good old days" meant that any-kind of
 
institutional choice could be made for any kind of reason. And everything
 
seemed to work. Now, in these relatively lean years for science, the
 
choices are more difficult, and they need to be more rational, objective,
 
open, and systematic..
 
Again speaking of scientific choice, Hendrik W. Bode points out:
 
"We are living in a pluralistic world, and the problem of scientific
 
choice becomes in the long run a problem of nonscientific judgment
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among these different conditions."' Certainly then, institutional
 
choice must also be a problem of judgment among relevant variables. In
 
the following pages, we describe criteria -hich may serve to introduce
 
a greater degree of systematic, objective, and open decision-making
 
into the process of institutional choice.
 
FOOTNOTES for CHAPTER III
 
1. 	Paul Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, 6th ed.
 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, chapter 1.
 
2. 	Alvin M. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science (Cambridge, Mass.:
 
The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 65.
 
3. 	A fine collection of articles on scientific choice is contained in
 
Edward Shils, ed., Criteria for Scientific Development: Public
 
Policy and National Goals; A Selection of Articles from Minerva
 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968).
 
4. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Reviews of
 
National Science Policy: United States (Paris: OECD, 196B7 p. 97.
 
5. 	Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (London: Oxford University
 
Press, 1968), p. 66.
 
6. 	John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton
 
Mifflin, 1967), p. 296.
 
7. 	Cf. Sanford A. Lakoff, "Scientific Society: Notes toward a
 
Paradigm," in Science and Policy Issues: Lectures in Government
 
and Science, ed. by Paul J. Piccard (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock
 
Publishers, Inc., 1969, p. 61: "... the fact remains that govern­
ment involvement in R and D has fostered a significant change in
 
the social structure. We must now begin to think of government as
 
a continuum involving both public and private agencies. The old
 
separation of government and society is obsolete. Political re­
lations must now be understood as a process of bargaining and
 
negotiation among public and private agencies in which politicians
 
and private leaders function as brokers and overseers in the
 
effort to apply science and technology to social concerns."
 
8. 	Tom Alexander, "The Unexpected Payoff of Project Apollo," Fortune,
 
LXXX (July, 1969), ll4-117ff.
 
9. 	John Gorham Palfrey, "Atomic Energy: A New Experiment in Government-

Industry Relations," quoted in Michael D. Reagan, Politics, Economics,
 
and the General Welfare (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company,
 
1965), p.76.
 
10. 	U. S. Bureau of the Budget, "Report to the President on Government
 
Contracting for Research and Development, April 30, 1962," in U.S.,
 
Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Utilization
 
of Federal Laboratories. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
 
Science, Research and Development, 90th Cong., 2nd Seass., 1968,
 
p. 339.
 
-54­
1. 	 Clarence H. Danhof, Government Contracting and Technological
 
Change (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 93.
 
12. 	Lakoff, "Scientific Society," p. 60.
 
13. 	Don K. Price, "Science in the Great Society," in Bertram M. Gross,
 
A Great Societ? (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 232.
 
14. 	Michael D. Reagan, Politics, Economics, and the General Welfare
 
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 79.
 
15. 	Michael D. Reagan, The Administration of Public Policy (Glenview,
 
Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 22.
 
16. 	Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our
 
Changing Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 2LF3ff.
 
17. 	Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 5.
 
18. 	Alvin M. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science, p. 172.
 
19. 	Price, The Scientific Estate, p. 36.
 
20. 	J. Stefan Dupre', "Comment on Part V Papers," in Economics of
 
Research and Development, ed. by Richard A. Tybout (Ohio State
 
University Press, 1965), p. 345.
 
21. 	Paul F. Hannah, "Regulation of Industry through Government Contracts:
 
Have We Reached the Point of Diminishing Returns?" in Reagan, The
 
Administration of Public Policy, p. 233.
 
22. 	Arthur S. Miller, "Administration by Contract," in Reagan, The
 
Administration of Public Policy, pp. 226-227.
 
23. 	 Ibid., p. 227.'
 
24. 	William D. Carey, "Science Policy Making," in Decision Making in
 
National Science Policy: A Ciba Foundation and Science of Science
 
Foundation Symposium, Anthony de Reuck et al, eds. (Boston: Little,
 
Brown and Company, 1968), p. 139.
 
-25. 	Sanford A. Lakoff, "The Scientific Establishment and American
 
Pluralism," in Knowledge and Power: Essays in Science and Govern­
ment, ed. by Sanford A. Lakoff (New York: Free Press, 1966)i p. 379.
 
26. 	Don K. Price, Government'and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in
 
American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),
 
p. 6­
-56­
27. 	 Gross, Bertram M. A Great Society? (New York: Basic Books, 1966),
 
PP. 3-5.
 
28. 	 State of the Union Address, January 22, 1970.
 
29. 	A critical view along these lines is taken by Richard J. Barber,
 
The Politics of Research (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966).
 
Also see H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science (Chicago: Quadrangle
 
Books, 1966).
 
30. 	James L. McCamy, "The New American Government of Science and
 
Technology," in Science and Policy Issues, ed. by Paul Piccard,
 
p. 44.
 
31. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Science, Technology, and Public Policy during the Ninetieth Congress
 
First and Second Sessions l9b7-6b. Report of the Subcommittee on
 
Science, Research, and Development, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969,
 
p. 163.
 
32. 	Norton E. Long, "Local and Private Initiative in the Great Society,"
 
in Bertram M. Gross, A Great Society?, p. 93.
 
33. 	Quoted in Bruce L. R. Smith, The Rand Corporation: Case Study of a
 
Nonpgofit Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass!: Harvard Press,
 
1966)3 p. 1.
 
34. 	 James L. McCamy, Science and Public Administration (University, Ala.:
 
University of Alabama Press, 1960), p. 55.
 
35. 	 U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Science, Technology and Public Policy, p. 156.
 
36. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories. Hearings before the Sub­
committee on Science, Research, and Development, 90th Cong., 2nd
 
Bess., 1968, p. 147.
 
37. 	Reagan, Administration of Public Policy, p.. 222.
 
38. 	Richard R. Nelson, Morton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalachek, Technology,
 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington: The Brookings
 
Institution, 1967), p. 60.
 
39. 	 Victor J. Danilov, "The Not-for-Profit Research Institutes,"
 
Industrial Research, VIII (February, 1966), 32.
 
40. 	Sandia Laboratories, Highlights of Technical Programs/1966

(Albuquerque: Sandia.Corporation, 1966), p. 2.
 
-57­
41. 	U. S., Federal Council for Science and Technology, Committee on

Federal Laboratories, Education and the Federal Laboratories
 (Washington: Federal Council for Science and Technology, 1968),
 
pp. 61-62, 65-67.
 
42; 	 Ibid., pp. 59-6o.
 
43. 	 Luther J. Carter, "Lunar Science Institute: Link between NASA and
 
Academe," 8cience,.CLXII (March 21, 1969); 1311-1313.
 
44. 	Bruce L. R. Smith. The Rand Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit
Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1966),
 
pp. 1l-14. 
Also 	see Daniel Bell, "The Adequacy of our Concepts,"
in Gross, A Great Society?, pp. 148-150, and Reagan, Politics,

Economics, and the General Welfare, p. 97.
 
45. 	 Reagan, Politics, Economics, and the General Welfare, p. 97. The
 
complete and definitive analysis of COMSAT is contained in Lloyd H.

Musolf, ed.,'Communications Satellites in Political Orbit (San

Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1968).
 
46. 	Roger A. Kvam, "COMSAT: The Inevitable Anomaly," in Knowledge and
 
Power, ed. by Sanford A. Lakoff, p. 291.
 
47. 	Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science, p. 65.
 
48. 	Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 9.
 
49. 	Bruce L. R. Smith, "The Concept of Scientific Choice: A Brief Review
 
of the Literature," American Behavioral Scientist, IX (May, 1966),

33.
 
50. 	Ibid., p. 33. Smith is referring to Carl Kaysen, "Federal Support

of Basic Research," in National Academy of Sciences, Basic Research
 
and National Goals: Report to the Committee on Science and
 
Astronautics, March, 1965, pp. 147-16U.
 
51. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, pp. 108-109.
 
52. 	Ibid., pp. 132-133.
 
53. 	 James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 25-26. 
54. 	 Ibid., p. 84.
 
55. 	Elmer B. Stats, "Making the 1967 Science Budget," in Science Policy

and the University, ed. by Harold Orlans (Washington: The Brookings

Institution, 196, p. 221.
 
56. 	Carey, "Science Policy Making," p. 156.
 
57. 	Quoted in Price, The Scientific Estate, pp. 49-50.
 
58. 	Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek, Technology, Economic Growth, and 
Public Policy, p. 3. 
59. 	William D. Carey, "Equipping Congress To Deal with Science," in 
Science Policy and the University, ed. by Harold Orlans, p. 269. 
60. 	 Daniel Bell, "The Adequacy of our Concepts," in A Great Society?, 
by Bertram M. Gross, p. 148. 
61. 	Quoted in Reagan, Politics, Economics, and the General Welfare,
 
p. 99.
 
62. 	Robert N. Kreidler, "The President's Science Advisers and National
 
Science Policy," in Scientists and National Policy-Making, ed. by
 
Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1964), pp. 126-127. 
63. 	Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron (New York: Oxford
 
University Press, 1969), p. 70.
 
64. 	Hendrik W. Bode, "Allocation of Federal Support among Scientific
 
Fields," in Science Policy and the University, pd. by Harold Orlans,
 
p. 127.
 
CHAPTER IV
 
CRITERIA FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
 
At this point in our nation's history, we are in the midst of
 
a reappraisal and revision of our national technological priorities.
 
As the mood of the nation swings away from the old triumvirate of
 
national defense, space, and atomic energy, and toward a new trium­
virate of natural resources, environment, and urban affairs, the pri­
orities for basic and applied technology are also shifting. New tech­
nological policies, programs, and institutions are needed to attack new
 
problems. A new range of issues is arising: "How can science and tech­
nology serve civilian society? How can you bring scientists, engineers,
 
politicians, entrepreneurs, ideas, and capital together to serve the
 
nation's nei social and technical needs? 11
 
In an attempt to answer this question, we have identified twenty­
five criteria which influence institutional choice within government
 
research and development programs. These criteria have been grouped for
 
discussion purposes into eight categories. Some duplication and over­
lapping will exist, but the total list of criteria provides a useful
 
framework for analysis.
 
A. NATURE OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
This category and the one following provide direct crosswalks from
 
considerations of scientific choice to institutional choice. Here we are
 
concerned with the type of research and development effort. For
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convenience we have modified the categories as specified in the Defense
 
2
 
Department:
 
1. Basic Research: Investigation of basic physical or behavioral
 
phenomena, usually not involving extensive experimental hardware.
 
2. Exploratory Development: Applied research and the design of
 
experimental hardware to test new principles and ideas.
 
3. Advanced Development: Development of hardware for experimental
 
and developmental tests; design and test of components and systems prior
 
to a production decision; and production planning and designs for systems
 
approved-for production.'
 
Institutional choices based on the nature of the research program
 
are commonly understood and applied in government. Thus, Wade Sewell
 
states:
 
By and large7b-asic7 research is carried out on a grant
 
basis, exploratory development in government laboratories and
 
the more advanced stages in development by contract although
 
there ares naturally, exceptions to this generalization. Such
 
an arrangement is rationalized on the grounds (1) that research
 
taleit is found in universities and (2) that, because of the
 
constraints they face in adjusting to changing levels of effort,
 
Government laboratories should be mqst heavily involved in work
 
with substantial funding stability.
 
The experience of the last thirty years bears out Sewell's analysis
 
fairly well, although the expected exceptions have occurred. The primary
 
role of universities in basic research through the grant mechanism was
 
noted by the Bell Report.4 However, it should also be noted that the
 
federally financed, university-operdted research centers tend to be more
 
involved in applied research of substantial scope and resource require­
ments on a contract basis.5.
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NASA has clearly marked out an institutional division of labor.
 
The universities have provided NASA with basic research.6 Research is
 
then institutionally divorced from development which is the responsi­
bility of industry under contractual arrangements. NASA retains the
 
technical management functions, test facilities, and some in-house
 
research capacity as a device to insure competent management of con­
7 
tractor and grant programs.
 
The National Institutes of Health also have maintained an insti­
tutional division of labor. Basic research programs are accomplished
 
through extra-mural grant programs with universities and non-profit
 
organizations which have been NIH's main resource for extra-mural sci­
eritific programs. Research and project grants are characterized by un­
directed research, individual or small group effort, relatively small 
sums of money per project, a minimum of agency monitoring, and a basis 
of scientific merit. Directed or applied researchprograms are oper­
ated by contractual arrangements, often with private laboratories. The 
distribution of NIH intra-mural effort. however, reflects the distri­
bution of the total program. NIH does not provide a specialized insti­
tutional role for its intra-mural laboratories in basic or applied
 
9
 
research.
 
The AEC experience has also led to institutional specialization.
 
The national laboratories are responsible for the development of concepts
 
and the preparation of test and engineering models. The industrial con­
tractors engineer components and provide pre-production models. Mariu­
facture is done in industrial firms.
10
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The National Bureau of Standards provides a unique exception.
 
Here, in keeping with Commerce Department tradition, the preponderance
 
of research and development work is intra-mural. Hence, the NBS labo­
ratories hjpve a-variety of functions ranging from basic research through'
 
applied research, development, and testing.
 
B. MERIT OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
 
Alvin Weinberg's three external criteria of scientific choice are
 
adopted here for analysis of their institutional implications:
 
4. Scientific Merit: The contribution of the scientific field to
 
other neighboring scientific disciplines.
 
5. Technological Merit: The readiness of the technological field
 
for exploitation.
 
6. Social Merit: The relevance of the technology to the solution
 
of social problems and the realization of social goals.
 
These criteria are often implicitly linked wifh the nature of the
 
research and development program. Thus, scientific merit is linked with
 
basic research; technological and social merit with applied and develop­
mental programs. If the implicit relationships are taken literally, then
 
we might forecast a shifting of research support away from the universities
 
and non-profit sector, which are the usual institutional vehicles for
 
basic research, as social merit receives new emphasis in federal tech­
nology programs. However, the analysis of institutional choice criteria
 
should not accept uncritically the implicit assumptions.
 
There is no question that the current priorities for research and
 
development are shifting toward social needs and away from science for
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science's sake. For example, James A. Shannon of NIH has stated:
 
"Our national program in support of science is entering a phase in which
 
the decision whether to support a given field depends less upon tech­
"
nical considerations than upon social needs. In suggesting a prior­
ities framework for federal technology, Michael Reagan gives his highest
 
12
 priority to "social objectives defined as most urgent politically.",,

The countervailing view is well put by the Office of Science and 
Technology: 
The persistent trend in government is to look from mili­
tary and technological needs down through applied problems to
 
directed basic research. Support of this "response research"
 
is then arranged to solve the applied problems. Frequently
 
this process results in doing safe, routine work and leads
 
only to incremental progress and a pedestrian use of
 
science . . . It has been pointed out frequently that suc­
cessful utilization of science for technological purposes is 
based on an imaginative collaboration between potential users 
of science and scientists, not on guidance of basic research 
by practical goals.13 
Regardless of how the argument between social and scientific merit
 
turns out, the organizational implications are clear. For example,
 
Weinberg has clearly stated his position: "Since universities are 
discipline- rather than problem-oriented, they are not the best insti­
tutions to help agencies solve their practical research problems. That
 
function is better performed by government and industrial laboratories
 
specially organized to perform it."14 Weinberg again clearly draws the
 
differentiation between the purpose of the government laboratory to ex­
ploit science and technology for the solution of social problems and the
 
15
purpose of the university to educate. He calls for an institutional
 
solution to social problems by raising a question and providing an 
answer: 
Can one recast social problems to accentuate their
 
technological character, and thus reduce them to a form
 
that can be attacked by the existing, hardware-oriented
 
government laboratories? . . . The proper instrument for
 
the attack on such complex issues as the cities or trans­
portation or water is a coherent institution . . . that
 
can devilop coherent doctrines with regard to such
 
issues.
 
Weinberg may be accused of following a line of argument that
 
would 	be of maximum benefit to his Oak Ridge National Laboratory, but
 
his basic division of labor between universities and non-academic labo­
ratories is supported by Harvey Brooks, whose allegiances certainly lie
 
with 	the academic world. 
Brooks states flatly that programs of scientific
 
merit are best handled by universities, and programs of social merit are
 
best handled by non-academic and national research centers.1 7
 
0. 	A CALCULUS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTEREST 
The objectives and principal beneficiaries of federal research and 
development programs have institutional implications. The criteria under
 
this category are:
 
7. The Private Enterprise Value System.
 
8. Technology for the Public Sector.
 
9. Technology for the Private Sector.
 
10. 	High Risk and High Cost Technology.
 
Basic to these criteria are considerations of American political and
 
economic values. "That government is best which governs least" and "let
 
the market process decide" are two homilies which affect the size, scope,
 
activities, direction, and institutions of American government. The argu­
ment of 'lassical economics is that the market mechanism provides the best
 
means of'determining the answers to the fundamental economic questions of
 
what is produced, how it is produced, and how goods are distributed. 
However, classical theory will admit that it is not possible to provide 
for pure public goods and services (e.g., national defense, health, edu­
cation, and welfare) through the market process. Therefore, government
 
expenditures, including research and development, are justifiable in con­
nection with the provision of public goods.18 The national interest also
 
requires technology which has primary benefit for a particular private
 
19
 
sector or for the economy as a whole. Public provision of technology
 
for the private sector is a great deal more controversial than for the
 
public sector.
 
The organizational implications of the Ameridan political and eco­
nomic value systems are manifold. The doctrine oftfree enterprise finds
 
official expression in the Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76, the es­
sential purpose of which is "to further the Government's general policy
 
of relying on the private enterprise system to supply its needs."20
 
These value systems may well be the principal reason for the heavy 
national emphasis on extra-mural research and development effort. 
Even where the technology is required for the public sector, there 
is a strong argument for the use of private enterprise and market mecha­
nisms. Harvey Brooks is provocative on this point:
 
In the area of "public goods" there is a growing feeling 
that the more public policy can achieve its goals by indi­
rection rather than by direct subsidy of R and D, the more 
likely is an optimal solution to be achieved. Thus to the
 
degree to which the public itself can be brought into the 
decision between technical alternatives through quasi-market 
mechanisms, the ultimate accomodation between public and 
private i erests is likely to bermore-acceptable and 
workable. 
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Other voices have included the Bell Report which was emphatic in its
 
support of contracting-out as being in the American tradition. The
 
National Research Council has gone on record recommending governmental
 
22
 
support of industrial initiative. The official doctrine has been that
 
research and development contracting strengthens free enterprise. The
 
net result in the last thirty years has been an increasing reliance on
 
private contractors which has paralleled the rapid growth of federal
 
23
 
research and development expenditures. Ironically, this use of free
 
enterprise in the conduct of public science programs has perverted the
 
concept to the point that we stand now at least at the edge of A planned,
 
statist economy.
 
One unanticipated consequence of the reliance on private enterprise
 
in the conduct of research anJ development has been the rapid develop­
ment and growth of a "hidden bureaucracy" -- private employees who really
 
S24
 
work for the government. In i6o, the Bureau ofithe Budget raised a 
most interesting question: "In what sense is a business corporation
 
doing nearly 100 per cent of its business with the Government engaged in
 
'free enterprise'? 25 Shortly after World War II, Dr. Edward U. Condon,
 
then Director of the National Bureau of Standards, issued a strong
 
challenge against the contracting practice, calling it an evasion of civil
 
service legislation. Condon called for an expansion of the intra-mural
 
effort in research and development, but he found little support0 26
 
A further consequence of this "evasion" is that the government is
 
placed in a position of competing with itself for scarce scientific man­
power. Not only does the government increase its own difficulty in
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recruiting talent for its intra-mural laboratories, it also induces
 
competition between other sectors of the economy. For example, Harold
 
Orlans reports: "Presumably the net effect of the government's bidding
 
with its right hand (in research, development and procurement contracts
 
with industry) against its left (in research and development contracts
 
and grants at universities) for scientific personnel is to raise their
 
wages, perquisites, and marketability." 27 Unfortunately, this competition
 
has done nothing to increase the supply of scientifib manpower.
 
The government-generated competition for scientific manpower has
 
the net effect of reinforcing the tendency to obtain technological per­
formance extra-murally. The financial support of university research has
 
enabled the academic world to compete more effectively with the private
 
sector. In the last analysis, an important rationale for institutional
 
choice is that the work will go where the talent is, and the government
 
has enabled and encouraged the private sector and the educational insti­
tutions to maintain their staffs. The process thus tends to feed on it­
self to the detriment of federal in-house capacity.
 
The fact that a particular technology may be required for the public
 
sector (strictly needed by a government agency in the performance of its
 
specific public function) seems to have had no consistent institutional
 
28
implications. For example, advanced technology for the most critical
 
and sensitive defense requirements is contracted-out as a matter of
 
course by the Defense Department or the AEC. On the other hand, the
 
National Bureau of Standards or the Food and Drug Administration rely
 
largely on intra-mural research and development in areas of standard­
ization and regulation.
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When federally supported technology is required for the purpose
 
of stimulating a particular industry in the private sector or the
 
economy in general, a new range of issues arises. Leading examples of
 
governmental support of private sector research and development include
 
the AEC's civilian applications programs, COMSAT, health, the supersonic
 
transport program, agriculture, and natural resources research programs.
 
The fundamental economic justification for such programs runs as
 
follows:
 
For certain kinds of activities essential to technical
 
progress, external economies and uncertainties tend to drive
 
a wedge between private incentive and social return, and for
 
others scale requirements may dwarf the capabi2ities of un­
aided private initiative. To compensate, polidies have
 
evolved to increase private incentives, or to increase private
 
capabilities. In a few cases the government itself has taken
 
responsibility for a large share of the R&D effort to stimu­
late2technological advance for general or private sector
 
use.2
 
We might be led to suspect that governmental support for private
 
sector technology would take the'form of predominantly extra-mural activi­
ties; however, such has not been the usual rule. Research programs of
 
the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce have been pre­
dominantly intra-mural. The justification for governmental support in
 
these program areas has generally been that the particular private sector
 
in question has not been able to support the socially desired level of
 
technology; therefore, the government has provided the support, not by
 
developing private capability but by performing the technology in-house.30
 
Other substantial program areas include health, aircraft, communications,
 
and civilian applications of atomic power have been characterized by
 
extra-mural operations. A subsidiary criterion to private sector
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technology appears to be the nature of the industry which is to be
 
supported and the general level of its technology.
 
The issues involved in governmental provision of technology for
 
the private sector are generally more controversial than those which
 
are concerned with technology for the public sector. These contro­
versies may tend to condition institutional choice. The principal argu­
ment revolves around considerations of spending government funds for tech­
nology which primarily benefits private interests. This controversy in­
truded seriously into the discussions and congressional action on the
 
supersonic transport (SST) and the communications satellite (COMSAT).
 
In regard to the latter, many officials felt strongly "that the govern­
ment should not finance efforts that would yield private profits beyond
 
the point at which the venture could stand on its own." '31  On another
 
front and in another problem, the Director of the National Bureau of
 
Standards felt constrained to point out very carefully that NBS did not
 
"encourage or authorize the development of commercial or proprietary
 
products."32
 
Most instructive in this regard is the dialogue which occurred in
 
1967 between the Director of the Bureau of Mines and Senator Anderson
 
and others regarding a Bureau proposal to perform extensive research on
 
rapid excavation methods (Project Badger):
 
Senator ANDERSON. Nh6 pays for this work? From where is
 
the appropriation?

Dr. HIBBARD. 
I believe that the research and development
 
to stimulate this type program is properly the responsibility
 
of the Government.
 
Senator ANDERSON. I think one of the things that con­
cerns me is the .fact that industry would be primarily the 
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beneficiary in the sense industry would be engaged in the
 
manufacture of this equipment. What sort of contribution
 
does industry make? Obviously, we all will benefit by re­
duced costs and improved technology, but how is this handled
 
from that standpoint?
 
Dr. HIBBARD. Industry contributed to the budget about
 
$500,000 a year, which is largely associated with construction
 
contracts. This is not a research-oriented industry. They
 
are responsive only to competition and need.
 
Senator ANDERSON. Is all the basic research being done
 
by the Federal Government?
 
Dr. HIBBARD. It is largely being done by the Federal
 
Government.
 
Senator ANDERSON. Why should industry not be more 
. . .
involved in this? 

Dr. HIBBARD. . . . Equipment manufacturers are not the
 
kind to undertake research necessary to produce the kind of
 
advancement we are talking about here.
 
* . 0 0 0 • * 0 0 0 0 0 • • • 0 0 • 0 0 • • * 0. . I . . . . . . 0 
Senator ANDERSON. I mean the benefits flow ultimately 
like any improvement in science and technology to the people 
as a rule, but it seems to me industry . . . has a tremendous 
opportunity. If they are looking for growth . . . I would 
think the equipment industry would move into this area and 
say to their board of directors, "This is a neglected area 
and I think we ought to get on the stick and g~t'with it." 
Is that not what business is looking for? 
Senator MOSS. Is this not the key to the SST development?
 
They decided industry would not do it, so the Federal Govern­
ment moved in.
 
Dr. HIBBARD. It is going to be extremely expensive.
 
Something industry is not going to do alone.
 
The CAIRMA *en ator Jackson 7. I think thisfis im­
portant. I am very surprised industry has not come forward 
with a joint venture approach in which industry could make 
available its talent and facities working in cooperation 
with the Federal Government. 
Project Badger's ultimate fate was not a happy one, and the Bureau
 
of Mines did not receive an appropriation to undertake the research. One
 
cannot help but wonder if the fate of the project might not have been
 
different if the institutional arrangement for the project had been dif­
ferent. We may speculate for example that if the project had been
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designed to stimulate or support a program of research and development
 
to be conducted on an extra-mural rather than intra-mural basis, the 
outcome might have been different. Certainly, those agencies which have 
emphasized extra-mural performance of research and development in the 
last thirty years have been greatly more successful in expanding their
 
programs than has the Bureau of Mines.
 
Another consideration of research support for the private sector
 
involves programs in which the economic cost and risk of the required
 
technology are too large to be absorbed entirely by private industry but
 
in which there is a substantial public interest. Sorting out the public
 
interest in such programs as development of the SST, the communications
 
satellite, and the civilian applications of the AEC is no easy matter.
 
It is perhaps easier to draw clear institutional implications, because
 
those ptograms involving high risk and high cost have usually been per­
formed in some variation of extra-mural manner.
 
In the case of the SST, the costs clearly were beyond the capacity
 
of industry. The decision to provide government financing was based on a
 
combination of national pride, commercial interest, and potential military
 
application. As to choice of institution, there was never any doubt
 
that the technology for the SST would be developed by the aerospace
 
industry. In this case the private sector had the capacity and would do
 
the job.
 
Development of the communications satellite raised serious questions
 
regarding institutional form. The final result of two years of legis­
lative pulling and hauling over the issues was the Communications
 
Satellite Act of 1962. The Act was the culmination of attempts by the
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executive and Congress "to design a legally, politically, and eco­
nomically viable entity to preside over the national effort to develop
 
a system of space communications in association with other countries. 0 5
 
Again, the problem involved costs which were beyond the capacity of the
 
communications industry. The institutional result is private in form
 
but heavily interlaced with governmental participation and funding.
 
Finally, in the case of atomic energy, there was of course no
 
existing private sector when governmental research began. Rather than
 
build an in-house establishment, the government instead deliberately
 
began developing a private sector. The theme of John Palfrey's early
 
essay on this subject is "the resulting complexity of a relationship in
 
which the government simultaneously regulates, subsidizes, promotes and
 
competes with a 'private' industry that it brought into being by legis­
lative fiat."36 Palfrey's analysis in confirmed by Harold Orlans who
 
tells us that the original decision to buy atomic technology by contract
 
included a specific consideration of the eventual need to establish a
 
civilian industry.
3 7
 
D. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
 
The efficiency and effectiveness of alternative institutional forms
 
are major considerations in the process of institutional choice. Specific
 
aspects of this category include the following criteria:
 
11. Competition between Institutions.
 
12. Availability of Facilities and Manpower.
 
13. Flexibility of Administrative Systems.
 
14. Relative Cost.
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The Bell Report of the Bureau of the Budget provides us with the
 
nearest approach that we have to criteria for institutional choice. In
 
this document, the criteria relative to efficiency and effectiveness are
 
given prominence. The Bell Report provides the following guidance:
 
In selecting recipients, whether public or private for
 
research and development assignments, the basic rule . . .
 
should be to assign the job where it can be done most ef­
fectively and efficiently, with due regard to the strength­
ening of institutional resources as well as to the immediate
 
execution of projects. This criterion does not, in our
 judgment, lead to a conclusion that certain kinds of work
 
should be assigned only to certain kinds of institutions.38
 
The Bell Report then makes a kind of qualitative analysis of the
 
advantages of the different kinds of institutions for different kinds of
 
work. Thus, direct federal operations are particularly suited to research
 
and development whichdirectly supports the management functions of the
 
agency; colleges and universities are traditionally oriented to basic
 
research; university-associated research centers are suited for basic and
 
applied research which requires large and expensive facilities; non-profit
 
organizations provide a degree of objectivity and infdependence; contractor­
operated government facilities have the advantages of government control
 
without the disadvantages of administrative inflexibilities associated
 
with federal employment; and private firms have advantages for advanced
 
development programs requiring the quick marshalling of-large and complex
 
resources.39 
 These capsule analyses, however, are not accompanied by
 
any guidelines for making specific determinations of relative efficiency
 
and effectiveness.
 
The Bell Report may be excused for its lack of precision, because
 
considerations of relative efficiency and effectiveness of public and
 
private research and development institutions ar difficult if not
 
impossible to handle.- The prospects of arriving at equitable mecha­
nisms for the evaluation of productivity are remote indeed. Reali­
zation of this has prompted economically oriented analysts to advocate
 
a quasi-market approach featuring mechanisms of competition which would,
 
as in a pure market situation, sort out the productive and non-productive
 
institutions.
 
The essential statement of the concept of institutional compe­
tition is from Charles J. Hitch who addresses the question of research
 
and development efficiency through manipulation of the institutional
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alternatives. He advocates competition between industry and between
 
agencies, and he also raises the question of how to curb the undesirable
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features of intet-agency competition. Harold Barnett takes the same
 
line of reasoning in advocating competition and multiple paths of develop­
ment. Barnett cites the experience of the Manhattan District which
 
sponsored "vigorous competition among different groups working separately
 
toward the same objective, with great success.r2
 
Two other authorities should be notdd on the subject of insti­
tutional competition. Dr. William B. McLean, Technical Director of the
 
Navy Undersea Warfare Center, relates competition to social values when
 
he testifies:
 
I believe the only nonsubjective measure of effectiveness
 
in R & D must result from comparisons on a competitive basis.
 
. . Competition between . . . laboratories, or groups of
 
laboratories, should be encouraged and the record of their
 
accomplishments evaluated. Our abilities to satisfy society's
 
needs are judged by competition and rewarded by success or
 
failure. Ts process provides high incentives and high
 
motivation.4#
 
On a more philosophiqal level, Michael Polanyi uses the example of the
 
economic market system as a prop for his argument for the freedom of
 
science from the threatened possibility of social control. Polanyi
 
states: '!We may affirm that the pursuit of science by independent self­
coordinated initiatives assures the most efficient possible organi­
"
 
sation of science. 14
 
The institutional implications of competitioniare multifaceted.
 
Competition implies utilization of a variety of institutional mecha­
nisms to achieve policy objectives. It also implies the absence or
 
control of prejudgments and favoritism in the selection of institutions
 
to perform research and development. An important illustration of the
 
hazards of inadequate competition is contained in recent critiques of the
 
National Institutes of Health. In NIH, according to one critic, one un­
anticipated consequence has been a "steady deterioration in the value of
 
a progressively greater percentage of experiments undertaken."h5
 
The criterion of availability of resources, and a subordinate con­
sideration of program urgency, have been significant in institutional
 
choice in the Defense Department, NASA, and AEC. In these cases, uti­
lization of contractors apparently has provided quicker access to the
 
massive resources required than would have an attempt to build staffs and
 
facilities within government, with all the political and administrative
 
difficulties which government staffing and facility construction interpose.
 
ABC is a particular case in point where the decision to utilize contractor
 
sources hinged on such factors as access.to skills, techniques, and per­
sonnel; insulation from political pressures; and the ability to match
 
types of organizations with specific tasks.46
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We have already noted the effects on manpower of the contracting­
out process, and we have implied that the nature of the industry in­
volved and its level of on-going technology have greatly influenced
 
institutional choice.J 47 The Bell Report has also noted the associ­
ation of large scale manpower and facility requirements with university­
associated research centers, contractor-operated government facilities,
 
and operations in the profit sector of the economy.
 
The "management considerations" utilized by NASA in making insti­
tutional choices are heavily weighted to questions of capability and
 
include the following:
 
1. Where the best capability is.
 
2. Whether that capability is really available.
 
3. The relative cost of each alternative.
 
4. Urgency, or the need to have a result by a certain time.
 
5. Whether capability is complete or must be built up.
 
6. Need to preserve in-house capability.9
 
One other aspect of resource availability shold be mentioned. A
 
stated purpose of some research and development prqgrams is the develop­
ment of additional resources, manpower, and centers of scientific excel­
lence. The Bell Report advocated standards of effectiveness and ef­
ficiency "with due regard to the strengthening of institutional re­
sources as well as to the immediate execution of projects."5 O The
 
Department of Commerce has gone on record advocating the utilization of
 
small firms in research and development contracting as a means of up­
51
 
grading national technological competence.

A major effectiveness and efficiency consideration has been the
 
criterion of flexibility of administrative systems. The practice of
 
contracting out public research and development programs has been
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-justified many times on the grounds that it avoids the inflexibilities,
 
low pay, red tape and other difficulties of civil service operations.
 
The federal establishment's reputation of fixed hierarchies, stuffy
 
attitudes, inflexible personnel policies, and inhibiting ceilings on
 
funds and personnel has been a frequent excuse for extra-mural oper­
ations.
 
We well may question whether this line of argument is compelling
 
reason or merely a justification for a preferred practice. Dr. Donald F.
 
Hornig gave evidence of some belief in the latter when he testified:
 
"An analysis has been made to determine whether the administrative
 
inhibitions found in those(Army, Navy, and Air Force7 laboratories have 
their origin in congressional actions, in civil service rules, or have
 
been self-generated with the individual departments and commands. Most
 
commonly it is the latter.152 Regardless of whether the so-called in­
flexibilities of the governmental administrative system are self- or
 
externally imposed, they exist to some extent in reality and to an even
 
greater extent in the minds of government decision makers.
 
For example, Dr. Gerald F. Tape, then a Commissioner of the AEC,
 
testified that the difference between direct and contractor operated
 
facilities is basically a personnel problem. He compared a civil service
 
system devised for millions of employees in all occupational categories
 
to the AEC's ability to devise personnel policies for mere thousands of
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employees and specifically for research and development personnel.
 
Certainly, in the early institutional decisions of the AEC, the extra­
mural approach was favored for its avoidance of the alleged dampening
 
effects of federal hierarchy on the scientific process.5e
 
-78-

Other agencies and other extra-mural institutional forms have
 
been influenced by a low opinion of federal in-service processes. The
 
establishment of RAND Corporation and other organizations like it has
 
been viewed favorably as an answer to the problems of public bureaucracy.
 
The opposing view is that such organizations represent a monstrous
 
evasion of civil service and governmental responsibility.55  The problems
 
are also viewed critically from inside the service as in the National
 
Institutes of Health which maintain a substantial intra-mural scientific
 
operation. The NIH admits to problems of staffing and housing its intra­
mural facilities and preserving scientific freedom in the mission oriented
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operations of a government agency. These problems are real, of course,
 
but the National Bureau of Standards and many other intra-mural govern­
ment research operations maintain high professional standards of integrity
 
and performance.
 
The final effectiveness and efficiency criterion has to do with the
 
question of relative cost of the different institutional methods of tech­
nological performance. The doctrine of relative cost is contained in
 
Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76 (Revised), August 30, 1967, which sets
 
forth guidelines for cost determination. We suspect, however, that the
 
Bureau's heart is not really in it, for the recent testimony of Phillip S.
 
Hughes, then Deputy Director of BOB, states: "With respect to the factor
 
of cost, BOB Circular A-76 provides guidance-for agencies to decide
 
among alternatives on the basis of cost comparisbns. However, as was
 
pointed out in Bureau testimony, program requirements and management con­
siderations are the most compelling determinants for choosing alterna­
tives in the research and development area."5
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The essential problem here lies in the extreme difficulty of
 
arriving at meaningful and valid cost comparisons between private,
 
academic, and federal laboratories. Questions of how to handle capi­
talization, subsidy, overhead, depreciation, and other matters must be
 
couplsdwith questions of the valuation of research and development
 
productivity. In such muddy waters, we suspect that cost comparisons
 
can be made to prove virtually anything an agency wishes them to prove.
 
One authority, however, has gone on record with a strong impression that
 
extra-mural operations have cost the governent more than would have
 
comparable work done in-house.58 Verification of this suspicion would
 
be difficult.
 
E. GOVERMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
 
In a system where substantial government operations are performed
 
by private organizations, where authority is seemingly dispersed, and
 
where responsibility even for policy formulation is unclear, how can the
 
integrity of the system be preserved? The question implies other questions.
 
How can we maintain policy control and fund accountability? How can we
 
judge and choose contractors and laboratories? How should we plan research
 
and development? How can contractors be made responsive to the public
 
interest as defined by the contracting agency? 9 These questions require
 
consideration of the following criteria;
 
15. Responsibility for Policy Development and Program Planning.
 
16. A Management Yardstick for Performance Evaluation.
 
17. Responsiveness to Mission Requirements.
 
18. Security, Military Support, and Governmental Regulation.
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The issue of governmental responsibility and accountability for
 
.research and development programs has engaged the attention of many
 
political analysts and not a few critics of the government's emphasis
 
on extra-mural operations. It is not just a question of conflict of
 
interest wherein public policy is made overtly -ith an eye to private
 
profit, although this is an important issue. The fundamental issue is:
 
Who is responsible and accountable for public policy decisions? After
 
all, the fundamental role of government is to make policy decisions. We
 
may safely contract-out operations but not policy decisions, or so the
 
argument runs. A clear statement of the problem is formulated by
 
Arthur S. Miller:
 
Accountability of power, the notion that power must
 
be responsibly'exercised, is fundamental in a democratic
 
society. In the contractual system, the problem of dis­
cretion in administration, unresolved in the public adminis­
tration itself, is magnified when power over governmental
 
decisions is turned over to private groups and individuals.
 
In brief, subdelegation of power which is itself almost unre­ 6 .
 
stricted has significant implications for a democratic society.
 
Perhaps we may safely say of policy decisions and planning responsibilities
 
in research and development the same thing that Gladstone said of budgets
 
nearly a hundred years ago: "Budgets are not merely matters of arithme­
tic, but in a thousand ways go to the root of prosperity of individuals, 
and relation of classes, and the strength of kingdoms. "61 
An official statement on this highly significant matter is con­
tained in the Bell Report: "There are certain functions which should
 
under no circumstances be contracted out. The management and control of
 
Federal research and development effort must be firmly in the hands of 
full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the President and
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the Congress." 62 Even one of the sharpest critics of the present oper­
ations of our federal government, Peter F. Drucker, who insists that 
government should not directly perform functions, also insists that 
government must retain and improve its role as the policy decision 
maker.6 
But if government:must retain its policy and decision making
 
function, at least two difficulties confront us. One revolves around
 
the complexity of the business government is in, the highly technical
 
considerations faced by decision makers, and the real problems of adequate
 
staffing of the government at policy levels. The second difficulty con­
cerns the fact that the operation of scientific programs is not like
 
running a factory. The requirement of technological creativity places
 
certain demands on the decision process. The first difficulty has to do
 
with the institutional methods by which government develops its decisions.
 
-I. 
The second has to do with questions of centralization and decentrali­
zation of policies, programs, and organizational effort. Both dimensions
 
are covered in Charles Hitch's question: "How can we decentralize to
 
promote initiative and spontaneity while maintaining policy control and
 
fund accountability?"64
 
One institutional approach is to centralize the policy, decision,
 
and planning processes within the agency as the Department of Agriculture
 
has done.65 While this may be possible in a unitary and traditional
 
field such as agriculture, other agencies, Defense in particular, have
 
felt impelled to seek policy advice from outside sources by creating and
 
supporting non-profit "civilian" organizations to provide analysis and
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advice on a continuing basis. The result has been the creation of the 
RAND Corporation and other similar advisory private institutions. Some 
of these corporations, RAND in particular, have assumed missions which 
66 
include analysis of broad policy issues as a principal task.
 
Bruce Smith provides an interesting analysis of the comparison
 
between intra-mural and extra-mural provision of policy analysis and
 
planning. To Smith, the in-house method has the advantage of quick re­
sponse, but he questions whether a single agency can provide a compre­
hensive enough view. Additionally, bureaucratic pressures can be brought
 
to bear on an in-house analytic group.6 7 Advantages of the extra-mural
 
approach include the facilitation of innovation, open channels of com­
munication, and the impartiality and independence of the non-profit insti­
6 8
 
tution.
 
Another approach to the delegation of responsibility to contractors
 
has been followed in the Atomic Energy Commission through an interesting
 
rationale. James Ramey has developed a theory of administrative contract
 
in which the contrabtor is a "quasi-agent" of the agency. Ramey admits
 
that the AEC "is trying to play both sides of the street in its contractual
 
relations." 69 In any event, in such a "holding company" arrangement, the
 
AEG "calls the signals and provides the top management, but it operates
 
through field offices with non-governmental contractors Another
 
significant element in the AEC situation is the vigorous interest of the
 
Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which participates perhaps
 
more than any other legislative body in the technological decision making
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 process. Somehow, with all the policy making at headquarters and in
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Congress, much in AEC is still left to the local initiative of the
 
contractor operated laboratories. This leads us to considerations of
 
centralization and decentralization.
 
The Atomic Energy Commission performs a useful function as it
 
searches for a degree of policy unanimity. But policy unanimity and
 
a commission organization are not sufficient to insure the performance
 
of action programs; therefore, the AEC contractors and laboratories are
 
given a high degree of freedom to get the job done without management
 
control. Technical management and the technology itself is entirely up
 
to the contracting laboratory.72 This is a concept which obviously has
 
been successful in technological terms; however, we now may speculate
 
that the technology has gotten a little too far past the point of the
 
oversight of responsible and accountable government. This may account
 
in part for the AEC's current difficulties with public interest groups
 
in opposition to atomic technology.
 
Research scientists and engineers like to tell us that effective
 
science can only be carried on in an atmosphere of freedom and inde­
pendence. Thus, we have noted Michael Polanyi's argument for a republic
 
of science and against the concept of directed, socially relevant
 
research. There may be some truth to the cynic's charge that, as
 
Daniel Greenberg says, "there is, to put it bluntly, a good deal of
 
scientifically nonproductive chiseling that flourishes under the colors
 
of scientific freedom." 73 Be that as it may, the issue of utility versus
 
curiosity must be faced squarely.
 
Harvey Brooks argues that central management of a scientific
 
enterprise is not effective, that decentralization and-diversity of
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support are desirable; however, he does call for improved long-range
 
planning.7 Brooks is echoed by Harold Barnett who states unequivocally:
 
"There is a great deal of direct evidence that centralization and strong,
 
detailed, and early programming of military research tend to.be less
 
productive of major advances and more costly than more competitive, un­
-
controlled, and exploratory approaches."7
 
Today, the argument seems to be coming down in favor of more di­
rected research to meet social needs. A recent example is found in NIH
 
where target research and increasing influence of the institutes on
 
research programs have resulted from criticisms of the free and easy
 
methods of the past.76 The Defense Department has similarly been
 
brought up short by the impact of the Manbfield amendment which reinforces
 
arguments for mission related research programs.
 
The institutional implications of the criterion of governmental
 
responsibility are fairly clear. Responsibility and: accountability for
 
policy, direction, and planning imply strong reliance on in-house capability.
 
As a minimum, capability must be maintained for policy decisions and
 
planning. The maximum is represented by direct intra-mural operations.
 
Utilization of the non-profit sector in the form of a RAD-type corpo­
ration has provided a controversial alternative.
 
The retention of responsibility and accountability within government
 
institutions also implies the requirement for competence to judge and
 
evaluate the results of work performed. In a sharp critique of govern­
mental practices in research and development programs, H. L. Nieburg
 
refers to this function as a yardstick. Nieburg contends that the as­
sential yardstick has in fact been broken and control lost as the
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intra-mural governmental science facilities have been engulfed in scope
 
and prestige by extra-mural operations.77 Don K. Price has also raised
 
the question of how the government can administer programs if all the
 
talent is with the contractors. 78  These criticisms and questions high­
light the significance of the evaluation function.
 
The need for federal in-house competence to evaluate programs has
 
been widely recognized. The problem is addressed by the Bell Report
 
which insists that agencies maintain sufficient technical competence so
 
that outside advice does not become de facto decision making. Addi­
tionally, agency operated installations are needed to provide sources of
 
79technical management personnel. The Bureau of th6 Budget position is
 
further articulated by Phillip Hughes in Congressional testimony when he
 
describes an important factor to be considered by ag~ncies in choosing
 
institutional alternatives: "The importance of maintaining or acquiring
 
technical competence within the agency to do both an effective job of
 
managing R&D programs and being a sophisticated buyer of the products and
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 services the agency requires.
 
The necessity of in-house competence has been fully recognized by
 
NASA even though ninety percent of the agency's research and development
 
effort is performed on an extra-mural basis. James Webb describes the
 
basis of NASA's early decisions as follows: "We decided to focus our
 
governmental efforts principally on developing the needed in-house
 
competence to make responsible decisions in every area involved, on
 
organizing and managing, and on ways to test and measure results. 81
 
The NASA intra-mural emphasis was thus concentrated on spelling out
 
general requirements, evaluating proposals, and judging performance.
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A later version of NASA's intra-mural philosophy is described
 
by Harold Finger: "NASA will maintain strong inhouse Civil Service
 
technical competence in order to define our technical goals and ob­
jectives and control our technical programs. We will also maintain
 
strong management and administrative competence in order to protect
 
the government's interests, and properly control the expenditure of
 
82
 government funds." 8 Finger describes the relationships of intra- and
 
extra-mural institutions in the NASA program as follows:
 
About 90 percent of our budget fs/ spent in industry
 
with the in-house laboratory competence providing a technical
 
interface with the contractors to anticipate problems, help
 
guide the contractors to the proper solutions of problems
 
that come up during the development programs. The labo­
ratories are then a very key part of our system for getting
 
the work done, but we do rely very heavily on the available
 
capabilities of industry. 3
 
Speaking for the Defense Department Dr. Donald MacArthur has also
 
testified to the importance of maintaining strong in-house competence.
 
In describing the specialized roles which different institutions play,
 
Dr. MacArthur stresses the importance of intra-mural institutions in
 
maintaining skills for the direction, monitoring, and evaluating per­
formance of the work performed by contractors.8h
 
If it has been official governmental policy to maintain a degree
 
of intra-mural technological competence, there has been official concern
 
over the ability of government to do so. The Bell Report notes that the
 
rapid increase of contracting has had a "deleterious" effect on in-house
 
competence. The Report makes specific recommendations that government
 
should "maintain first-class facilities and equipment of its own to
 
carry out research and development work." The Report then proposes
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several measures of reform to improve the government's intra-mural
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capacity.
 
The emphasis in past years on extra-mural operations has if any­
thing increased the need for intra-mural governmental competence in
 
research and development. This paradox is directly related to the
 
government's self-generated difficulty of recruiting sufficient,
 
competent, technologically trained manpower. If government is to dis­
charge its responsibilities, it must maintain control. This was amply
 
indicated by the criticism which fell on the National Institutes of
 
Health recently when a particular extra-mural program apparently abdicated
 
responsibility to the contractor for program review and evaluation.86
 
The implication for institutional choice is that government must con­
tinue to utilize intra-mural facilities and manpower, and it must
 
maintain its technological operations at a high qualitative level.
 
The responsiveness of research and development programs to agency
 
and mission requirements is another criterion whichl has led to an aware­
ness of need for in-house capability. The Bell Report made the point
 
very clearly:
 
Direct Federal operations, such as the governmental

laboratory, .enjoy a close and continuing relationship to
 
the agency they serve which permits maximum responsiveness
 
to the needs of that agency. Such operations accordingly
 
have a natural advantage in conducting research, feasi­
bility studies, developmental and analytical work, user
 
tests and evaluations whi9h directly support the management
 
functions'of the agency.
 
Another view is that of Donald Hornig who looks at the functions of in­
house laboratories and finds them particularly suitable for expeditious
 
solution of new problems faced by an agency and for an ability to take
 
quick advantage of technological breakthroughs occurring anywhere in
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the world.

If intra-mural operations have the-advantage of closeness to the
 
agency's mission, extra-mural operations have the disadvantage of in­
creasing remoteness. There is after all a very human tendency for
 
people and institutions to respond most directly to their own immediate
 
goals. A contractor's first loyalty is to his own organization, his
 
profit position, and his reputation. His second loyalty may then be to
 
the objectives of the contract granting agency. Thus, Stephen Toulmin
 
in his article "The Complexity of Scientific Choice" quotes Aubrey Jones:
 
"The doing of research by external agencies 'is a convenient administrative 
device for certain purposes at certain moments of time. But the greater
 
use of external agencies-the more certain it is that the research will be
 
distant from the purposes of the departments affected." 89
 
Finally, two other considerations 
-- direct military support and
 
federal regulatory activities 
-- can be included in another criterion
 
which implies intra-mural institutional utilization. For example, the
 
Defense Department policy has long emphasized contracting except in
 
limited instances including projects which are purely military and thus
 
unsuitable for private enterprise.90 Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76
 
specifically authorizes direct governmental operation of work which is
 
tied to combat support or mobilization readiness. 91
 
The other dimension of this criterion involves work connected with
 
governmental regulation, enforcement, and standardization activities. 
Again, intra-mural activity is the normal institutional form as in the
 
case of the National Bureau of Standards which has "fundamental
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responsibility for providing the central basis within the United States
 
of a complete system of physical measurements matched to the needs of 
American science and industry. ,92 This responsibility is joined with 
responsibility for provision of data on the basic properties of material. 
In this second function, the Bureau serves as a "scientific service
 
center" for the rest of government.93 Again, this function has led to
 
intra-mural emphasis; however, the more basic research aspect of this
 
function has also opened the door to some extra-mural activity.
 
Another example of intra-mural institutional choice in the regu­
latory area is the Food and Drug Administration which maintains in-house
 
laboratories to carry out its functions of determining the efficacy and
 
safety of drugs and the development of scientific standards relating to
 
"the composition, quality, and effects of foods, drugs, cosmetics, and
 
pesticides."94
 
F. PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION 
Public science policy must be responsible and accountable, but to
 
be effective it must also involve the participation and representation
 
of a multitude of organizations, interest groups, and political insti­
tutions. Don K. Price states a pragmatic view when he says: "If you
 
want to get something done in a policy field, you get a group of research
 
institutions, allied with a congressional committee and an executive
 
agency, preferably with the support of an enthusiastic economic pressure
 
group." 5 This concept implies a kind of closed circle of interest
 
groups with the general public on the outside looking in. Of late, the
 
look has become more 'and more hostile to science and technology. We
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therefore must turn to a fundamental question: How should the general
 
public be represented in the formulation and execution of public science
 
programs? The institutional criteria in this category are:
 
19. Public and Political Participation and Representation.
 
20. Scientific Community Participation and Representation.
 
21. Geographical Parity.
 
The remarkable success of the scientific community in the last
 
thirty years in expanding its scope and influence has led inevitably to
 
the question: Can science be left to the scientists? Critics of the
 
scientific community answer the question in the negative. 96 Even as ac­
cepted a member of the community as Donald Hornig has said: "The shape
 
of science and the directions of scientific progress are no longer a
 
matter for the scientific community alone; they have become part of the
 
public enterprise."9 7 This means that a greater involvement of the
 
public and of Congress is required. This also means that non-scientists
 
should have a voice in technological judgments. Another respectable
 
member of the scientific community, Harvey Brooks, has pointed out the
 
fundamentally political nature of technology today and the successful
 
decision influencing role of many lay generalists. Brooks says: "There
 
are times when stating the need for a particular invention without any
 
knowledge of how it can be done technologically may be a much more im­
portant step than the technological solution itself.,,
98
 
It is perhaps easy to call for greater public participation in
 
science policy affairs, but it is more difficult to devise institutional
 
mechanisms to achieve this objective. Partial solutions have been applied
 
in some program areas. For example, NASA was well aware of the need for
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broad support at its inception. James Webb tells us: "In our plural­
istic society any major public undertaking requires, for success, a
 
working consensus among diverse individuals, groups, and interests. 
 . 
All large-scale endeavors must be carried on in careful recognition of
 
the necessary participation of legislative leaders."9 9 NASA did a re­
markable job in developing a broad base of support in the executive and
 
legislative branches of government and in the industrial sector. 
 NASA
 
attempted to do the same, with less uniform results, in the academic 
world. But, except for an ambitious public-relations program aimed at
 
the public as spectators, the lay public was not appreciably involved.
 
The leading example of broad public involvement is in the research
 
programs of the Department of Agriculture. For almost a hundred years,
 
agricultural research has been the product of remarkable cooperative
 
venture. 
There have been close working relationships with states,
 
farmers' organizations, industrial concerns, universities, and research
 
foundations. The result has been a unique blending of national, regional,
 
and local interests which has had exceptional results in terms of agri­
cultural productivity and efficiency.1 00
 
While most agricultural research is carried out intra-murally,
 
there is significant extra-mural activity conducted through contract and
 
grant programs with state, private, and industrial institutions and firms.
 
Overall research policy is influenced by the National Agricultural
 
Research Advisory Committee. This committee was established by executive
 
order of the President in 1953. Its twenty-five members are appointed
 
by the President. 
Not more than fifteen are members of one political
 
party; at least eighteen represent farmers; and the membership reflects
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geographic representation.101 Through such devices of representation
 
and participation, the agricultural research programs have marshalled
 
1 02
 
impressive political support.

The development of the communications satellite represents another
 
institutional form which provides for substantial citizen participation.
 
COMSAT features private ownership under public regulation, and the corpo­
rate board of directors has three of the fifteen directors appointed by
 
the President to represent the public interest. The Communications
 
Satellite Act of 1962 was the final outcome of technical and political
 
rivalries, with the virtues of free enterprise weighing heavily in the
 
original decisions.103
 
Finally, we have noted the unusual participation in AEC policy
 
decisions by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in Congress.104 Subse­
quent attempts to establish similar joint committees for other tech­
nological areas have not been successful in Congress.
 
The issue of participation of th& scientific and industrial com­
munities has been consciously fostered in the planning and conduct of
 
most public science programs. A concept of the scientific adviser has
 
grown up around this issue. The sponsoring agencies have found it natural
 
and desirable to seek the participation of those individuals, institutions,
 
and firms most directly concerned with the fields of technology involved
 
in agency programs. The scientists themselves have wished to participate
 
because participation has given them substantial opportunities to advance
 
their own disciplines and interests.10 This participation has taken
 
mary forms, but the overall effect has been to foster diversity of support,
 
decentralization of decision making, and the utilization of extra-mural
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institutions for the performance of government technology.106
 
The necessity of broad participation was well understood by the 
founders of NASA. James Webb has said: "We decided as a matter of 
deliberate policy to place principal reliance on the entire American in­
dustrial establishment and the American University system. . We have. .
 
sought in NASA, with much success, a working partnership between uni­
versities, industry, and government."' 07 In its origins, NASA was the
 
result of an interplay and conflict between all interested parties,
 
agencies, scientific groups, politicians, and industrial interests.lO0
 
The origin was followed by conscious attempts to broaden the base of
 
industrial and academic participation. Perhaps the ultimate example of
 
NASA's search for participation is the establishment of the Lunar Science
 
Institute which is designed to bring non-NASA scientists further into the
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 space program.

The National Institutes of Health represent perhaps the leading
 
example of involvement of the scientific community in the operation of
 
federal science programs. The participation is secured through the frame­
work of advisory committees, study sections, and the National Advisory
 
Councils which advise and assist the federal managers of the Institutes
 
in decisions regarding review, selection, and funding of extra-mural
 
research projects. The NIH reports officially: "The result of this
 
review process is that the deployment of grant support acrossthe broad
 
range of biomedical problems reflects the consensus of those actually
 
engaged in related research."ll0 Herbert Rosenberg brings out another
 
aspect of this process: "Thus, with some significant exceptions, the
 
substantive content of the extramural grant program is not planned. 
It 
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emerges from the interaction of the research interests of qualified
 
investigators and peer evaluation of scientific merit."ll
 
In other words, in medical research, "the scientific community is
 
running itself."112 This, of course, raises again the question of
 
accountability of government decisions. And it also raises the question
 
of a need to improve the planning and coordination function and to im­
prove the representational structure itself to avoid the solidification
 
of an ingrown circle of advisers who advance their own interests and
 
discourage outsiders. The significance of the role of the scientific
 
adviser in the federal government has been examined closely by Harvey
 
Brooks who sees a "platitudinous consensus" as the greatest hazard of
 
this government by committee.13 The NIH has responded to such problems
 
by an increasing emphasis on directed research and greater Institute
 
influence over areas of research investigation.
 
The National Bureau of Standards approaches Vhe question of repre­
sentation and participation of the scientific community in multiple ways. 
First, NBS staff members are active in hundreds of professional technical 
committees and working groups. This is viewed as a means of strength­
ening NBS programs and activities and of communicating information 
about the Bureau's work to the outside community. Second, NBS has a 
statutory Visiting Committee, established by law, and comprised of five 
prominent representatives from science and industry, which regularly 
appraises Bureau programs. Third, the NBS has a contract with the 
National Academy of Sciences -- National Research Council which furnishes 
a continuing evaluation of NBS programs. The NAS-NRC, in cooperation 
with professional societies, appoints advisory panels of technical
 
experts who provide guides in the formflation and execution of the
 
Bureau's work. These panels also serve as a link between the NBS and
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the scientific,community.l1
 
A relatively new issue of geographic representation has arisen to
 
confront federal decision makers. Federal expenditures for technology
 
have been greatly beneficial primarily to the northeast and west coast
 
regions of the United States. Funds have tended to flow to those regions 
and institutions with the greatest established competence, and as a
 
result the rich have tended to get richer while those regions and insti­
tutions with lesser staff, facilities, and reputations have been relatively
 
neglected. This phenomenon persisted until it ran into the old American
 
tradition of political regionalism. The politics of geographic distri­
bution now represent a significant criterion for institutional choice.l15
 
One result has been a National Science Foundation program for the
 
development of additional centers of excellence. This program deliber­
ately allocates funds to-universities with the dual objective of obtaining
 
quality research results and strengthening the scientific program of the
 
grantee. The Defense Department's Project Themis has had'a similar
 
orientation.
 
Another manifestation of geographic representation has been the
 
development of regionally based associations or consortiums of universities
 
to participate in large-scale federal technology programs. Finally, con­
sideration of the location of federal in-house laboratories and the
 
allocation of funds and projects are frequently conditioned by geographi­
cal location. Geographical parity as a criterion of institutional choice
 
could, of itself, do much to alleviate existing geographic imbalances in
 
-96­
116 
the expenditure of federal funds for research and development.
 
G. EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
 
In Michael Reagan's priorities framework, he ranks science-related 
7educational needs second only to social needs.1l This is a fair indi­
cation of the general realization, implicit or explicit, in many federal
 
science programs of the vital importance of developing and maintaining
 
an adequate base of scientific manpower and institutional competence for
 
research. The institutional criteria are:
 
22. Scientific Manpower Training and Development.
 
23. Educational Institution Development.
 
In the last decade the federal government has maintained an official
 
policy of encouragement and support of theeducation of scientists and
 
engineers. This policy is part of the government's recognized need not
 
only to perform or obtain technological program results but also to
 
"maintain and enlarge the long-term strength of the Nation's scientific
 
resources, both public and private. "ll8 The policy has been expressed in
 
part by direct assistance programs to students. More importantly, sub­
stantial support of educational programs has come in the form of grants
 
in support of university-based research projects which in turn have pro­
vided financial and facility support for students. In addition, federal
 
policy has strongly encouraged government laboratory facilities to be
 
located in the proximity of universities. 19 Such co-location is advan­
tageous for both parties in terms of use of facilities, joint projects,
 
the use of federal facilities as training sites for students, and the
 
facilitation of continued education for federal scientists.
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An additional thrust of the federal policy toward educational
 
institutions has-been the objective of strengthening the institutions
 
themselves, through the mechanism of institutional grants as opposed to
 
specific project grants. The government has deliberately followed
 
policies of supporting scientific excellence where it is found and also
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of supporting the development of additional centers of excellence.
 
The institutional support of individual universities has been viewed as
 
necessary to basic research and also to the maintenance and development
 
of national scientific capability.121
 
The NASA program offers a prominent example of an agency's evalu­
ation of multiple criteria in reaching decisions to aatilize academic
 
institutions. As Wesley Hjornevik says: "The intent of those who en­
visioned space flight was not simply to pursue and complete a project;
 
rather, it was to build a solid baseline of advanced technological
 
competence in the United States." 12 2 A central concept of this intent
 
was the use of universities to provide basic research and also to pro­
duce trained manpower. The institutional realization of the concept was
 
obtained by not pulling researchers away from the universities but by
 
leaving them there and supporting them in mutually interesting and
 
significant projects.1 23
 
The net effect of the government's support of academic insti­
tutions has been a remarkable growth in size, prestige, funds, facilities,
 
and faculty of the technological departments of colleges and universities.
 
However, there is no evidence that massive federal support of academic
 
science has increased the proportion of student enrollment in the sciences
 
and engineering, nor has it served to concentrate the best and brightest
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students in the technical disciplines.l2 
4
 
H. TWO OTHER CRITERIA
 
For convenience we are joining two essentially dissimilar criteria
 
together in one general category. The first, technology transfer, is
 
an objective still imperfectly understood and achieved. The second,
 
past practice, is perhaps one of the most influential of criteria which
 
might appear under the less complimentary name of organizational inertia.
 
24. Technology Transfer.
 
25. Past Practice.
 
The problems of achieving rapid diffusion of khowledge horizontally
 
through the public and private sectors and vertically through the scien­
tific disciplines invoke substantial considerations of institutional
 
choice. The essential problems of technology transfer have been identi­
fied by Harvey Brooks as related to the standard organization of govern­
ment and industry for vertical transfer from science to product or
 
mission, and the failure of government and industry to develop insti­
tutions to apply technology horizontally across public and private sectors 
in such problem areas as pollution, transportation, and medical tech­
nology. Brooks speaks to these problems with two recommendations:
 
Federal policy should include a purpose of fostering

the rapid diffusion of the technology induced by govern­
ment research and development, and consideration of the
 
economic impact of government R and D.
 
'.... .. . ..............
eeee..  

In order to foster horizontal in addition to vertical
 
transfer of technology large broad spectrum federal research
 
institutions should regard it as part of their function
 
to market new technologies to other federal agencies nd
 
missions and to institutions in the private sector.125
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The government has made some attempt to meet these problems.
 
The State Technical Services Act of 1965 established a technology trans­
fer function within the Commerce Department. This somewhat controversial
 
operation was apparently achieving some success when its appropriations
 
were terminated by Congress for fiscal year 1970. There is hope that the
 
function will be resumed perhaps in the form of an industrial extension
 
service patterned after the Agriculture Department's extremely successful
 
agricultural extensioh service.
 
Other agencies including the Departments of Transportation and
 
Housing and Urban Development have specific organizational units charged
 
with responsibility for technology transfer, and the Commerce Department
 
operates an information service under the title of Clearinghouse for
 
Federal Scientific and Technical Information.126
 
Perhaps the most energetic such effort is NASN's technology uti­
lization program which has recognized the significance of technology
 
transfer as an essential support for the space program. The concept of
 
"spin off" technology was applied early in NASA's history, perhaps in
 
anticipation of the latter day criticism of the space effort as being
 
socially non-utilitarian. The attempt of NASA and other agencies to
 
foster technology transfer by utilization of an in-house organizational
 
unit clearly demonstrates one institutional method of achieving the dis­
semination of research and development results for broader application.
 
The NASA experience also illustrates another institutional method
 
oftachieving technology transfer -- that of utilization of private
 
contractors and universities in the performance of research and develop­
ment. Harold Finger's comment on this subject is appropriate:
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"Through the project activities in universities and industries we
 
believe that the process of having that work done in those institutions
 
(means that7 they can apply the technology to other activities that they
 
have in all areas."127
 
The validity of Finger's belief and of Brooks' analysis of the
 
vertical organization of technological effort was demonstrated earlier
 
by a Denver Research Institute study of the commercial application of
 
space technology. DPI discovered that technology transfer occured most
 
easily within the same organizational unit in which the innovation was
 
developed, and that technology flowed to other organizations and other
 
sectors with difficulty and only with the intervention of some middle­
man device. DRI's summary states:
 
There are apparent gaps between the persons or organi­
zations responsible for developing missile/space technology
 
and those persons or organizations which can give such tech­
nology commercial application. However, market requirements
 
information must be linked with missile/space technological
 
knowledge before commercial applications can occur. Linkages
 
between market information and technology appear to take
 
place more easily inside a single division of a firm than
 
between separate divisions or separate firms. A few mecha­
nisms for bridging these gaps between organizations with
 
missile/space technology and other organizations with com­
mercial marketing capabilities have been established and
 
their effectiveness in facilitating linkages is worth
 
investigati6n.120
 
Turning now to the consideration of past practice, we find this to
 
be a criterion which has a powerful influence on institutional choice and
 
which is often taken for granted. The inclination to preserve an ongoing
 
facility or program at an equal or greater level of ongoing budget sup­
129
 
port is strong indeed. This is not to say that changes never occur.
 
The research orientations of Public Health Service and the Army and Navy
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Departments were strongly intra-mural during the 1930's, but they
 
switched dramatically to extra-mural program emphasis during the 1940's
 
and in subsequent years. The in-house inclination of NACA changed to
 
the ninety percent extra-mural emphasis of NASA. 'The Departments of
 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior all have moved slowly toward greater
 
emphasis on extra-mural activities, while the Veterans Administration,
 
interestingly enough, has moved in the opposite direction.1
30
 
The dramatic changes occurred during World War II when great
 
program demands were coupled with severe manpower shortages within the
 
federal service. Most changes in program emphasis, however, occur
 
incrementally; and barring crises, emergencies, and overwhelming public
 
outcry, we may safely speculate that innovation by any agency in matters
 
of institutional choice will be slow and gradual.
 
j

The fact that past practice is such a strong ifluence on insti­
tutional choice indicates that the criterion should-be brought out into
 
the open and analyzed for what it is. In their discussion of this factor,
 
Elmer Staats and William Carey make a strong point for openness 6f con­
sideration and for ignoring sunk costs in arriving at decisions about
 
131
future programs.
 
I. CONCLUSION
 
It would seem that the only universal criterion for institutional 
choice is that individuals and agencies will be different, that we 
Americans will be pluralistic, inventive, competitive, individualistic,
 
and perhaps chaotic in our institutional arrangements. Every insti­
tutional form has in some way met a range of criteria, and all the
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criteria we have discussed (and undoubtedly others) have been used in
 
some degree by one or more agencies in arriving at their choices. It
 
now remains for us to display in concise, graphic, and tabular form the
 
general relationships of institutions, criteria, and choice, and then
 
to examine the requirements of the minerals sector in relation to the
 
most appropriate criteria.
 
FOOTNOTES for CHAPTER IV
 
1. 	Herbert Roback, "Presenting Scientific and Technical Programs to
 
the Congress," in Science Policy and the University, ed. by Harold
 
Orlans (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 263.
 
2. Wade P. Sewell, "Some Policy Issues in the Analysis of Research and
 
Development Programs," in U. S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
 
The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System.
 
A Compendium of papers submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in
 
Government, Volume III, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969, p. 1071.
 
3. 	ibid., pp. 1080-1081.
 
4. U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting for Research
 
and Development," in The Politics of Science: Readings in Science,
 
Technology, and Government, ed. by William R. Nelson (New York:
 
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 204-206.
 
5. 	Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalachek, Tech­
nology, Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington: The Brookings
 
Institution, 1967), p. 60.
 
6. 	Hugh L. Dryden, "The Role of the University in the Exploration of
 
Space," in University of Washington, Science, Government, and the
 
Universities (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), p. 31.
 
7. 	Wesley L. Hjornevik, "Guiding Work Relationships among Scientific,
 
Engineering, and Administrative Professionals," Issues in Public
 
Science Policy and Administration (Albuquerque: University of New
 
Mexico, 1969), pp. -6.
 
8. 	U. S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Advisory Com­
mittee to the Secretary, "Advisory Councils and NIH Contracts," in
 
Michael D. Reagan, The Administration of Public Policy (Glenview,
 
Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 215.
 
9. 	U. S. National Institutes of Health, The Advancement of Knowledge
 
for the Nation's Health: A Report to the President on the Research
 
Programs of the National Institutes of Health. (Washington:
 
USGPO, 1967), p. 7.
 
10. 	Ramey, James T., "The Functions of Government in the Development and
 
Control of Atomic.Energy," in Nuclear Energy, Public Policy and The
 
Law, ed. by-Edward Bloustein (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceans Publi­
cations, 196h), pp.. 1-16.
 
-103­
11. 	 James A. Shannon, "Bio-medical Sciences - Present Status and
 
Problems," in University of Washington, Science, Government and
 
the Universities, p. 63.
 
12. 	Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 279. 
13. 	U. S., Office of Science and Technology, Solid State Sciences Panel,
 
Research in Solid-State Sciences (Washington, National Academy of
 
Sciences, 1968), pp. 8-9.
 
14. 	Alvin M. Weinberg, "Government Allocations to Basic Research," in
 
Science Policy and the University, ed. by Harold Orlans, pp. 159-160.
 
15. 	Alvin M. Weinberg, "The Philosophy and Practice of National Science
 
Policy," in Decision Making in National Science Policy, Anthony de
 
Reuck et al, eds. pp. 33, 36.
 
16. 	Ibid., p. 36.
 
17. 	Harvey Brooks, The Government of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: The
 
M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 143-145.
 
18. 	Gerhard Cola, Essays in Public Finance and Fisca. Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 36-37. 
19. 	Nelson, Peck and Kalachek, Technology, Economic'Growh, and Public
 
Policy, p. 151'.
 
20. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee of Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968,
 
p. 132.
 
21. 	Brooks, The Government of Science, p. 262.
 
22. 	National Academy of Sciences, Toward Better Utilization of Scientific
 
and Engineering Talent (Washington: National Academy of Sciences,
 
1964), p. 30. 
23. 	 Clarence H. Danhoff, Government Contracting and Technological Change

(Washington: TheBrookings Institution, 1966), p. 93.
 
24. 	Michael D. Reagan, Politics, Economics, and the General Welfare 
(Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 96. 
25. 	Quoted in Don K. Price, The Scientific Estate (London, Oxford Uni­
versity Press,. 1968), p. 38.
 
26. 	Danhoff, Government Contracting, p. 55.
 
-105­
27. 	 Harold Orlans, The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education:
 
A Study of 36 Universities and Colleges (Washington: The Brookings
 
Institution, 1962), pp. 20-21.
 
28. 	Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek, Technology, Economic Growth and Public
 
Policy, pp. 154-156.
 
29. 	Ibid., p. 159.
 
30. 	Ibid., pp. 166-167.
 
31. 	Roger A. Kvam, "COMSAT: The Inevitable 'Anomaly," in Knowledge and 
Powerr 	Essays in Science and Government, ed. by Sanford A. Lakoff 
-NewYork: Free Press, 1966), p. 274. 
32. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 46.
 
33. 	U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Scientific Programs - Hearings before the SenateE Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 1967, pp. 18-20. 
34. 	Reagan, Politics, Economics, and the General Welfare, p. 79.
 
35. 	 Kvam, "COMSAT: The Inevitable Anomaly," p. 271. 
36. 	Reagan, Politics, Economics and the General Welfare, p. 80.
 
37. 	Harold Orlans, Contracting for Atoms: A Study of Public Policy
 
Issues Posed by the Atomic Energy Commission's Contracting for
 
Research, Development, and Managerial Services (Washington: The
 
Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 27. j
 
38. 	U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The
 
Politics of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 204.
 
39. 	Ibid., pp. 204-205.
 
40. 	Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the
 
Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: . Harvard University Press, 1967), 
pp. 219-221. 
41. 	Ibid., pp. 250-251, 258-260.
 
42. 	Harold J. Barnett, "Research and Development, Economic Growth and
 
National Security,".The Annals of the American Academy of Political
 
and Social Science, CCCJOVII (January, 1960),Is-45.
 
43. 	Testimony in U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and
 
Astronautics, Utilization of Federal Laboratorids, p. 80.
 
44. 	Michael Polanyi, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and
 
Economic Theory," in Criteria for Scientific Development, ed. by
 
Edward Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 3.
 
45. 	John Lear, "Science vs. Democracy: The Developing Struggle,"

Saturday Review, L (November 4, 1967), 59.
 
46. 	Norris Bradbury, discussion held at Los Alamos, New Mexico,
 
November 21, 1969.
 
47. 	See above, p. 67.
 
48. 	U. S. Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The Politics
 
of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 205.
 
49. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science in Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 109.
 
50. 	U. S. Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The Politics
 
of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 204.
 
51. 	U. S., Department of Commerce, Technological Innovation: Its Environ­
ment and Management (Washington: U. S. Government Printin Office,
1967 ). 
52. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laborator es, p. 7. Als9 see the testimony
 
of Dr. William H. Pickering, pp. 116-1l7.
 
53. 	Ibid., p. 242.
 
54. 	Orlans, Contracting for Atoms, p. 17.
 
55. 	Bruce L. R. Smith, The Rand Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit

Advisory Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1966),
 
pp. l4-17. 
56. 	Herbert H. Rosenberg, "Research Planning and Program Development in
 
the National Institutes of Health," The Annals of the American
 
Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXXVII (January, 1960),
 
103-113.
 
57. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization oif Federal Laboratories, p. 133.
 
58. 	James I. McCamy, Science and Public Administration (University, Ala.:
 
University of Alabama Press, 1960), p. 57.
 
59. 	The first and last questions are Danhof's. The other three are
 
Hitch's.
 
-107­
60. 	Arthur S. Miller, "Administration by Contract," in Michael D.
 
Reagan, The Administration of Public Policy (Glenview, Ill.:
 
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), p. 228.
 
61. 	Quoted in Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: Wiley
 
and Sons, 1956), p. 6.
 
62. 	U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The
 
Politics of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 201.
 
63. 	 Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guideline to our Changing
 
Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 235.
 
64. 	Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense, p. 258..
 
65. 	 U. S., National Science Foundation, Federal Organization for
 
Scientific Activities, 1962 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
 
Office, 1962), pp. 27-30.
 
66. 	Smith, The Rand Corporation, p. 14.
 
67. 	Ibid., pp. 241-244.
 
68. 	Ibid., pp. 298-304.
 
69. 	Ramey, "The Functions of Government in the Development and Control
 
of Atomic Energy," in Nuclear Energy, Public Policy and the Law,
 
ed. by Edward Bloustein (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications,
 
1964), p. 5.
 
70. 	Ibid., p. 6.
 
71. 	Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of'the Atom: 
 The
 
Integration of Powers (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 26U-270.
 
72. 	 Norris Bradbury, discussion held at Los Alamos, New Mexico,
 
November 21, 1969.
 
73. 	 Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (NewYork: The
 
World Publishing Co., 1967), p. 289.
 
74. 	Brooks, The Government of Science, pp. 26-39.
 
75. 	Barnett, "Resbarch and Development, Economic Growth and National 
Security,' 44. 
76. 	 Rosenberg, "Research Planning and Program Development in the National
 
Institutes of Health," 109.
 
77. 	 H. L. Nieburg, In the Name of Science (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1966), p. 220. ­
78. 	 Don K. Price, Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relations in
 
American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),
 
p. 92.
 
79. 	U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The
 
Politics of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 202.
 
80. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 133.
 
81. 	James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The Large-Scale Approach

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 113.
 
82. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 109.
 
83. 	 Ibid., p. 89. 
84. 	Ibid., pp. 147-148.
 
85. 	U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The Politics
 
of Science, ed. by William Nelson, pp. 216-218.
 
86. 	 Lear, "Science vs. Democracy," 57-61. 
87. 	 U. S., Bureau of the Budget, "Government Contracting," in The Politics 
of Science, ed. by William Nelson, p. 204. 
88. 	 Donald F. Hornig, "Federal Research Laboratories," Science, CLX
 
(May 10, 1968), 627-628.
 
89. 	Stephen Toulmin, "The Complexity of Scientific Choice: 
 A Stocktaking,"

in Criteria for Scientific Development, ed. by Edward Shils, pp. 77-78.
 
90. 	Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 56.
 
91. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 379.
 
92. 	U. S., National Science Foundation, Federal Organization for
 
Scientific Activities, p. 79.
 
93. 	 U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 45.
 
24. 	U. S., General Services Administration, National Archives and Records
 
Service, United States Government Organization Manual 1969-70
 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 340.
 
-109­
95. 	Don K. Price, "Science in the Great Society," in Bertram M. Gross,
 
A Great Society? (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 239.
 
96. 	Richard J. Barber, The Politics of Research (Washington: Public
 
Affairs Press, 1966), p. v.
 
97. 	 Donald F. Hornig, "A Look Ahead, in University of Washington,
 
Science, Government and the Universities, p. 17.
 
98. 	Brooks, The Government of Science, p. 314.
 
99. 	Webb, Space Age Management, p. 94.
 
100. 	Byron T. Shaw, "Research, Planning and Control in the United States
 
Department of Agriculture," The Annals of the American Academy of
 
Political and Social Science, CCCXXVII (January, 1960), 96.
 
101. 	U. S., National Science Foundation, Federal Organization for Science,
 
pp. 28-29.
 
102. 	Elmer B. Staats, "Making the Science Budget in 1967," in Science
 
Policy and the University, ed. by Harold Orlans (Washington: The
 
Brookings Institution), 1968, p. 227. Also see Charles M. Hardin,
 
The Politics of Agriculture: Soil Conservation and the Struggle
 
for Power in Rural America (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952).
 
103. 	Kvam, "COMSAT: The Inevitable Anomaly," pp. 274-; 280, 284.
 
104. 	Green and Rosenthal, Government of the Atom, pp. 268-273.
 
105. 	Price, Government and Science, p. 79.
 
106. 	Brooks, The Government of Science, p. 113.
 
107. 	Webb, Space Age Management, pp. 113, 117.
 
108. 	Enid C. B. Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in Knowledge and
 
Power: Essays in Science and Government, ed. by Sanford A. lakoff
 
(New-York: Free Press, 1966), p. 236.
 
109. 	Luther J. Carter, "Lunar Science Institute: Link Between NASA and
 
Academe," Science, CLXIII (March 21, 1969), 1311-1313. Also see
 
above p. h6.
 
110. 	U. S., National Institutes of Health, The Advancement of Knowledge
 
for the Nation's Health: A Report to the President on the Research
 
Programs of the National Institutes of Health (Washington: U. S.
 
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. l6b.
 
Ul1. 	Rosenberg, "Research Planning and Program Development," 109.
 
-110­
112. 	C. West Churchman, discussion held at Albuquerque, New Mexico,
 
January 7, 1970. Dr. Churchman makes specific reference to the
 
operation of National Allergy Institute, of which he is a member.
 
113. 	 Harvey Brooks, "The Scientific Adviser."' in Scientists and
 
National Policy-Making, ed. by Robert Gilpin and Christopher

Wright (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 73-96.
 
ll4. 	U. S., National Science Foundation, Federal Organization for
 
Science, pp. 86-88.
 
lS. 	Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 417.
 
16. 	Bruce I. R. Smith, "The Concept of Scientific Qhoice: A Brief
 
Review of the Literature," American Behavioral'Scientist, IX
 
(May, 1966), 33.
 
117. 	Michael D. Reagan, Science and the Federal Patron (New York:
 
Oxford University Press,"1969), pp. 294-295.
 
u18. 	 U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 138.
 
119. 	U. S., President's Science Advisory Committee, Scientific Progress,

the Universities, and the Federal Government (Washington: U. S.
 
Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 20-21.
 
.120. Ibid., p. 20.
 
121. 	Bruce Smith, "The Concept of Scientific Choice," 33.
 
122. 	Hjornevik, "Guiding Work Relationships among Scientific Engineering,

and Administrative Professionals," p. 6.
 
123. 	Dryden, "The Role of the University in the Exploration of Space,"
 
p. 31.
 
124. 	 Orlans, The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education, p. 38. 
Also see Werner A. Baum, "Federal Funds on Campus," in Science 
and Policy Issues: -Lectures in Government and Science, ed. by
 
Paul J. Piccard (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.,
 
1969), p. 85.
 
125. 	Brooks, The Government of Science, pp. 260-261, 278.
 
126. 	"Technology: U. S. Seeks to Show the Facts," Business Week,
 
No. 2116 (March 21, 1970), 58-60.
 
127. 	U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
 
Utilization of Federal Laboratories, p. 101.
 
Also see: Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 126.
 
and Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gager, eds., The Study of
 
Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 86-291.
 
128. 	Denver Research Institute, The Commercial Application of Missile/
 
Space Technology, Part 1 (Denver: Denver Research Institute -

University of Denver, 1963), p. vi.
 
129. 	Elmer B. Staats and WilliamfD. Carey, "Fiscal and Management 
Dilemmas in Science Administration," in Issues in Public Science 
Policy and Administration (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 
1969)j, p. 5. 
130. 	Danhof, Government Contracting, p. 70.­
131. 	Staats and Carey, "Fiscal and Management Dilemmas in Science
 
Administration," p. 16.
 
CHAPTER V
 
THE CRITERIA MATRIX
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of criteria for institutional
 
choice for performance of minerals technology programs, it may be use­
ful to recapitulate the discussion of the preceeding chapter in summary
 
form. A summary matrix display, figure 6, contains the twenty-five
 
criteria discussed above arrayed in relation to the eight principal
 
types of institutional mechanisms for the accomplishment of federal
 
science programs, as defined in Chapter III.
 
The matrix permits, in a very generalized way, an identification
 
of the predominant utility of each kind of institutional alternative.
 
A strong degree of utility is indicated in the matrix with the symbol
 
"X". This generalized approach, as demonstrated in figure 6, is based
 
on the preceding discussion and is intended to be primarily illustrative.
 
Any individual agency might well arrive at a different weighting of
 
utility for each institutional alternative in relation to each criterion
 
as conditioned by the specialized nature of the agency's program.
 
Some version of the criteria matrix lies at the heart of the
 
decision process leading to institutional choice. The matrix serves as
 
a summary representation of the variables which influence decisions.
 
As such, it can serve as a tool for analysis, understanding, and
 
weighting of the nultitude of influences which bear on any single insti­
tutional decision. Use of this tool will serve to increase the openness,
 
rationality, effectiveness, and objectivity of institutional decisions.
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ll. CompetitionXX
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10. Security and Regulation X x x
 
PARTICIPATION
 
19. Public Participation X
20. Scientific Community x X x
 X
 
21. Geographical Parity - X X
 
EDUCATION
22. Manpower Training x x 
­
23. Institutional Development X x x
 
OTHER CRITERIA
 
2. Technology Transfer Xx X
 -
25. Past Practice X x X x - x 
A high degree of applicability of criteria to institutional form 
is indicated by the symbol X". 
Criteria Matrix for Institutional Choice
 
Figure 6. 
In this, we take the position of Howard and Morgenroth who believe
 
of the decision-maker "that largely to the extent he fully articulates
 
his view (constructs a model) of this decision process he will be ef­
2
 
fective in carrying out his task.",

In questions of institutional choice, the decision-maker is con­
fronted with relatively flexible situations featuring a low degree of
 
objective data and requiring a high degree of subjective evaluation.
 
The basic operational mode of the decision process is one of a com­
parison of given situations and data with a wide variety of standards,
 
values, objectives, images, aspirations, organizational procedures, and
 
some objective information. Decisions resulting from this comparative
 
process are represented by institutional choice.
 
It now remains for us to apply such a decision process to the
 
requirements of national policy for the minerals sector.
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CHAPTER VI 
INSTITUTIONS FOR MINERALS RESEARCH 
As we have indicated in Chapter II, an adequate supply of mineral
 
resources at a reasonable cost is a fundamental element in the strength
 
of the general economy and, therefore, in the national interest. As­
surance 
of a future long-term adequacy requires a general upgrading of
 
technological effort, both in quality and quantity. 
The market process
 
is not providing sufficient technology. Neither are government and
 
the universities in their present programs. 
But any kind of improve­
ment will require the involvement of government, industry, and the uni­
versities if the challenges are to be met.
 
A. THE- NEED FOR POLICIES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
A large scale technological effort requires a coordinated effort 
-
the kind of mobilization of industry, universities, and government which
 
has been so successful in the fields of atomic energy, space, and health.
 
The need for this kind of partnership in the minerals sector has long
 
been recognized in the Department of the Interior, but the institutional
 
mechanisms for establishing the partnership have not been established.
 
Many reasons may account for the failure of the partnership to
 
materialize. 
It may in part be due to a general lack of recognition
 
within the federal government of its role in supporting private sector
 
research and development in areas, such as minerals, where the market
 
process does not produce sufficient technology.1 Another reason has
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to do with institutional inadequacies. The required machinery for co­
ordination of all relevant interests has been lacking, and traditional
 
bureaucratic forms have been inadequate.
2
 
Also lacking, as we have noted, have been adequate statements of
 
purpose, objectives, and policies of government in regard to minerals.
 
The direction of needed institutional change must be predicated on a
 
clear understanding of the purposes to be achieved. 
Both ends and means
 
must be considered. The inadequacies of policy and objectives in miner­
als technology can be demonstrated by comparison to other federal
 
programs. In the Defense Department, NASA, and AEC, an aggressive
 
pattern has been followed:
 
"The decision makers in these programs chose not to
 
wait passively until research and development had been
 
undertaken by others. They decided to engage upon a de­
liberate search for new ideas and new technology. . . .
 
They have attempted 
- and successfully = to bring the
 
resources of science and technology to bear . . . and
 
they have melded the effort6 of scientists engineers,

industry, and the Government in the task."t
 
There are 'signs that the government is beginning to take its re­
sponsibilities for minerals policy and objectives more serioisly. 
The
 
Senate hearings in 1963 and again in 1969 brought forth official calls
 
for partnership, new government initiatives, and greater attention to
 
these matters.4 In 1968, an aggressive Director of the Bureau of Mines
 
pointed out:
 
In our political and economic system, it is the responsi­
bility of private industry to develop and exploit resources to
 
meet demands of the market place. It is the federal govern­
ment's role, however, to assume a position of leadership in
 
determining the projected needs, in supplying the long-range
 
scientific and technologic support for the minerals industry,

and in using techniques such as education, communication of
 
information, and cooperation to encourage industry to
 
attack the vital problems of minerals supply. Such
 
assistance is especially necessary where the risks
 
are too costly to be undertaken by a corporate entity,
 
and where the reward5 benefit the public rather than a
 
particular industry.2
 
Perhaps the most promising indication of new developments in govern­
ment is contained in the recent statement of Lee DuBridge to a Senate
 
committee:
 
We envision that the Department of the Interior would
 
take the lead in identifying the areas where research and
 
development of new technology would be most useful. While
 
this first step would be conducted or funded by the govern­
ment, its purpose would be to guide industrial and university
 
efforts as well as subsequent government work. In cooperation
 
with the Bureau of Mines, we have recently contracted with
 
TRW, Inc., . . . to develop an R&D plan for underground coal
 
mining. This is really an experiment to ascertain how ad­
vanced technologies and methods can be applied to a parti­
cular segment of the mining industry and, hopefully, may
 
provide a model fog Interior"s subsequent efforts on other
 
minerals problems.
 
The burden of every argument is for greater partnership. Private
 
authors have made the point forcefully; state governments have recog­
nized the need; Congress has made a case for the p4rtnership; and
 
present Interior Department leadership has taken a stand for greater
 
7
 
inter-sector cooperation. It would seem that we are close enough to
 
unanimity of opinion, close enough to the statement of policy, that we
 
may now turn our attention to institutional mechanisms for achieving
 
the partnership. The culminating objective in the remaining pages is to
 
suggest an institutional framework for policy decision as well as
 
program operation in the minerals sector. In drawing up a blueprint for
 
an institutional design, we will look first at the criteria for insti­
tutional choice which are relevant to minerals technology.
 
B. MINERALS AND INSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA
 
In developing an effective approach to improved minerals tech­
nology, the first questions refer to how it should be done and by whom.
 
What will meet the peculiar requirements of the minerals problem? The
 
discussion in Chapter II brought out many considerations. We propose
 
now to relate those considerations to specific criteria.
 
1. Nature of the Research and Development Program.
 
The technological challenge of miherals research required in the
 
public interest tends to be of an exploratory and advanced development
 
nature. There is some continuing requirement for basic studies, as has
 
been pointed out by Walter Hibbard.8 However, the principal problems
 
are not-in the realm of fundamental or basic science. This point was
 
made clearly by the Paley Commission:
 
Few of the demands made upon technology by the minerals
 
problem lie in any realm of high scientific difficulty. The 
problem lies elsewhere - in costs. . . . The all-embracing 
problem for technology in the materials field is to insure a 
steady, concentrated flow of materials, rich in diversity, at 
costs which will make possible their wider and wider utilization. 
The wonders of science are not t issue here; what is at issue
 
is the hard facts of economics.
 
The institutional implibations of this are that assignment of
 
programs to national laboratories and contracts with industrial firms
 
will provide the most likely sources of minerals research competence.
 
Other possibilities could perhaps include university-government coopera­
tive enterprise where the university department concerned is oriented to
 
applied research as in the case of engineering departments. A public/
 
private enterprise is appropriate for applied development, but the
 
minerals sector lacks the unity of objective or industry structure which
 
characterized the communications industry in COMSAT.
 
2. Merit of the Research and Development Program.
 
Considerations of merit share similar implications with the nature
 
of the program. The principal objectives of publicly supported minerals
 
research are to secure technological improvements for the achievement of
 
the social goals of maintaining adequate supplies of needed minerals at
 
acceptable costs. Again, the institutional implications lean to national
 
laboratories and industrial firms.
 
3. A Calculus of Public and Private Interest.
 
The doctrine of free enterprise has not been applied consistently
 
in terms of governmental support of technological development. While
 
there has been no hesitation on the part of government to have research
 
performed by private industry in aerospace, defense,and communications,
 
there has been little inclination to do the same in~the minerals sector.
 
We are perhaps faced with a national or public feeling about "clean"
 
industries versus "dirty" 6nes, new industries versus old, and other
 
such value judgments. We have noted that it was only in 1966 that the
 
Bureau of Mines was able to obtain authority to contract-out minerals
 
research and development projects.
 
In a sense, this may be a reverse twist on the free enterprise
 
argument. If, as John Gray has pointed out, the economic operation has
 
been dominant in determinations about materials technology, then we are
 
truly expressing free enterprise values.1 This leads us possibly to
 
the origins of the debate between Senator Anderson and Dr. Hibbard re­
garding the propriety of funding technology which benefits private
 
industry.11 Some light is perhaps now shed on the paradox of the govern­
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ment's inclination to buy technology from extra-mural sources for public
 
sector programs, while it has the reverse tendency to perform in-house
 
that research which benefits the private sector.
 
This brings us face to face with the institutional implication.
 
We have suggested that minerals research has a prominent public utility
 
aspect even though the immediate beneficiaries are in the private sector
 
of our economy. In such an intertwined and complex environment of public
 
and private benefit, logic drives us to a conclusion that research which
 
has substantial benefit for a private sector should be performed sub­
stantially in theprivate sector with government support.. This line of
 
reasoning also supports another desirable objective of minerals policy ­
that of increasing technological competence and activity in the private
 
minerals sector.
 
This is not to say that the long-established and well-developed
 
intra-mural capacity of government for minerals research and development
 
should be abandoned. The establishment by responsible public officials
 
of effective national minerals policy requires technological data as
 
well as economic and social information. The technological support of
 
policy determination is a public sector function well suited to govern­
ment laboratories.
 
We have ample precedent for mixed public/private effort where
 
benefits accrue to both sectors. For example, the House Committee on
 
Government Operations hasnoted:
 
In farming, it was clear to the Federal Government from
 
the 19th century onward that the fragmented nature of farms
 
would not encourage private R & D. In health and medicine,
 
during the 1950's and 1960's, the Government has acted on the
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assumption that community benefits from increased research
 
would be substantially greater than the value accorded such
 
research by individuals as such. In civil aviation, the
 
Government has taken into account the inability of even
 
large private firms to assume the high risks and hugj2costs
 
of major forward leaps in technological development.
 
If this is not sufficient justification for additional extra-mural effort,
 
we may turn to the Paley Commission which made clear its belief in private
 
enterprise as the "most efficaciousway of performing industrial tasks in
 
13 
the United States.", And of course we may also call on the Bell Report
 
and Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76, as previously noted.14
 
Considerations of high cost and high risk technology in the miner­
als-sector implies the necessity or desirability of government support.
 
As John Gray says of minerals research: "Research of the kind suggested
 
here ought to be done mainly by the industries concerned; but as most of
 
it will not yield an early return, industry will be reluctant to under­
'
take it."I5 The institutional implications of this criterion revolve
 
around the requirement of large scale resources, and this requirement
 
implies combined efforts and marshalling of resources. In the minerals
 
industry in particular and in others like it where profits are low, the
 
industrial structure is fragmented, and where technological development
 
is extremely costly, special programs are required. J. Herbert Hollomon
 
has addressed this need:
 
"We need to create a means for encouraging associations
 
of companies and industries to do technical work that benefits 
them as a group when it is too costly and wasteful to carry on 
the work separately. . . . An industrial analogue of agri­
cultural extension education is required, and it is the responsi­
bility of government, both locq and federal, and the universities
 
and industry to establish it.
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i. Efficiency and Effectiveness.
 
The question of how to develop effective institutional resources
 
for minerals research is best attacked on the basis of incentives. We
 
have noted Harvey Brooks' call for indirect incentives rather than di­
rect subsidy of research and development. His argument is that
 
through use of indirect incentives, the market process can be approxi­
mated and the public itself thereby involved.17 This view has the merits
 
of maximum use of market processes, but indirect incentives such as tax
 
advantages lead to charges of favoritism for specific industries. If
 
the reduction of the depletion tax allowance for the oil industry can
 
be taken as an augury, such incentives may be hard to come by in the
 
face of public opinion regarding special privileges for those industries
 
which have unfortunate environmental side effects..
 
Another approach to quasi-market mechanisms is through the means
 
of competition between institutions for research support. This appears
 
to be a promising methodology of institutional choice which could con­
tribute to the effectiveness of performance and also to the generation
 
of additional capacity in the private and academic sectors. The use of
 
"imaginative rivalry" has been cited as a means of improving innovation
 
in Defense Department supported technology.18 Charles Hitch's original
 
concept of competition implied the effective rivalry between industry
 
and between governmental agencies.19 In the present structure of minerals
 
technology, competition between government laboratories, private companies,
 
and university research interests for government supported and funded
 
research programs could have beneficial long-term results. In today's
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minerals sector, another possibility -- the small firm -- should also
 
be encouraged and supported as a source of technological development.
 
This is argued officially by the Commerce Department, and a good eco­
nomic analysis of the use of small firms is presented by Daniel
 
20 
Hamberg.-
A critical determinant of institutional choice is the availability 
of qualified manpower and adequate facilities. We have advocated compe­
tition as a means of upgrading all resource sectors. Below, we will 
look to educational programs for long-term provision of necessary man­
power resources. But in the present situation, the mineral industry is 
characterized by a relatively low level of technological effort, which
 
implies an inadequate resource base. The intra-mural activities of
 
government, on the other hand, providb a solid base-of technological
 
competence, thus reinforcing the necessity of continuing intra-mural
 
activity. The relatively low level of technological activity in the
 
minerals industry indicates the need not only for government support of
 
research and development, but also for institutional forms of cooperative
 
21
 
effort as in the case of agriculture. A small scale example of co­
operative effort in the minerals sector has been in bituminous coal
 
research sponsored by the Bureau of Nines, Office of Coal Research, and
 
22
the coal industry.
 
We are not addressing the criteria of flexibility and relative cost.
 
All systems of organization have built-in inflexibilities. Research and
 
development can be accomplished efficiently and effectively by Civil
 
Service employees and by contract personnel, by academic scientists and
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by the staffs of non-profit corporations. Questions of relative cost
 
are at this point incapable of elucidation to anyonels satisfaction.
 
Decisions regarding institutional form are best made 
on other grounds.
 
5. Governmental Responsibility.
 
The basic functions of government in the minerals sector include
 
regulation of certain aspects of industrial activity, most notably
 
environmental protection and health and safety of workers, and develop­
ment of information necessary for policy decisions. 
 If there were a
 
substantial increase in extra-mural activity, the function of evalu­
ation of contract or grant performance would assume greater proportions.
 
Each of these functions implies maintenance of the strong intra­
mural capacity which presently exists in governmental agencies. Alterna­
tives to intra-mural operations conceivably could include creation or
 
utilization of an advisory corporation such as RAND, or creation of an
 
impartial bridging institution to stand between government and the
 
piivate and academic sectors.
 
6. Participation and Representation.
 
In the American social context, the most significant criteria are
 
not really connected with efficiency as much as with a process of govern­
ment which involves multitudes of interests and people; In devising new
 
institutional forms for the technology required to accomplish new social
 
objectives, we need to keep uppermost in mind the importance of partici­
pation and representation. 
By participation and representation we also
 
must mean a broader public, a larger sense of national interest than we
 
can obtain from just those private and public participants in a closed
 
system. In considering institutional choice, and in applying criteria
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of choice, we are required by the needs of our time to emphasize those
 
criteria pertaining to participation and the selection and development
 
of institutions appropriate to those criteria.
 
In a recent study of the innovative process, the National Academy
 
of Engineering reaches a conclusion supporting the significance of non­
technical processes: "There appears to be general agreement that the
 
process of successful technological innovation depends on many more
 
factors than the mere generation of scientific and engineering
 
information. . . Gaps, if they exist, appear to be in the under­
standing of social and environmental factors that influence mnanagement
 
and government decisions."23
 
Many of the environmental issues surrounding the minerals industry 
have created substantial public interest, controversy, and outcry. The
 
public is becoming increasingly involved in these issues, but the public
 
has no effective method of participation in policy formulation and
 
decisions. We have noted the urgent need for full participation of all
 
segments of the minerals sector, and in particular the scientific com­
munity, in an attack on the problems of minerals. To this we must add
 
the participation of the broader public. But again, effective means for
 
a fuliy coordinated effort do not presently exist.
 
Participation and interaction between government, industry, and
 
the universities is not adequate. For example, William Harris draws
 
attention to the unfortunate degree of separateness existing between the
 
Bureau of Mines and the minerals industry. This separateness exists in
 
the face of real problems of technology, economics, and environment.
 
In 1963, the Federal Council for Science and Technology made "a forth­
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right plea . . . for greater cohesiveness in industrial research on 
minerals and much closer cooperation between industry, universities,
 
and federal'agencies. "24 The FOST also advocated a 
broader, ecological
 
perspective and an interdisciplinary approach to solving minerals
 
problems.
 
The formulation of public policy conventionally is the result of
 
a complex process of bargaining, interaction, maneuvering, and brokerage
 
in the midst of a whirlpool of interest groups, each represented in some
 
26 
way in the decision process. In the minerals sector, this political
 
process is poorly coordinated, for the process is as fragmented as the
 
industry, and there is no suitable arena for the interaction. Additionally,
 
as in most American political processes, there is a substantial problem
 
of the process reflecting the outcome of interest group interaction but
 
not considering any larger issues of public interest and the total
 
constituency.
 
The institutional implication of this is that some device must be
 
found to improve the participation and representational processes in the
 
making of mineral policy and the conduct of minerals research programs.
 
We may look to many examples developed over the years in federal tech­
nology programs of institutions for the representation and participation
 
of the scientific community. These include the use of advisers, con­
sultants, study sections and peer evaluation panels, and cooperative and
 
joint enterprises. Unfortunately, the scientific community in general
 
and the governmental science/policy relationships in particular have not
 
yet evolved institutional mechanisms for the representation and partici­
pation of the larger public.
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7. Educational Considerations.
 
The need for upgrading the minerals education process, both from
 
the standpoint of students and of institutions, has been widely dis­
cussed and documented.. However, because of the applied and develop­
mental nature of most minerals research programs, the universities are
 
less appropriate institutions for the conduct of minerals research.
 
Yet some way must be found to support minerals education, for the long2
 
term need is critical. As Brown, Bonner, and Weir have pointed out:
 
We are immersed in a technical age which feeds upon

technical brainpower. If we wish to produce mqre and more
 
goods for more and more people from ores of lower and lower
 
grade, then we must find the technical brainpower to develop

the essential knowledge and to apply it with the necessary

skill and diligence. Only in this way can a highly in­
dustrialized nation contnue the development which is neces­
sary to its maintenance.
 
We have noted that in some federal programs requiring larg6-scale
 
facilities, universities and consortiums of universities have become
 
involved as sponsors, managers, and operators of applied and develop­
mental programs. This would appear to be an appropriate method to ob­
tain university involvement and to add to university incentive for sup­
port of minerals programs without impinging or diluting the university's
 
primary function of education.
 
8. Other Criteria.
 
There is obviously:little use in governmental support for tech­
nological 'development in the minerals sector if such technology does not
 
become quickly and widely diffused. As noted previously, technology
 
transfer is improved through the utilization of private contractors and
 
universities in the accomplishment of federally supported research.
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When intra-mural facilities are used, as in the Bureau of Mines and
 
the Bureau of Standards, an institutional device is required for the
 
dissemination of technical information,
 
The criterion of past practice implies continuance of the govern­
ment's major emphasis on intra-mural operations in minerals research.
 
L 
Any depletion of the existing technological resources within government
 
would be most unfortunate, because these resources represent the major
 
organized and coherent source of minerals expertise. What we are saying
 
essentially implies full use of existing intra-mural resources plus use
 
of additional sources for technological effort. This in turn implies a 
higher level of total funding for minerals research on a goverrment-wide 
basis. We should then regard existing government facilities as a base 
to be improved qualitatively, if possible, but not quantitatively.
 
Program increases should by this argument be diverted to extra-mural
 
operations.
 
In summary, the above applications of institutional choice criteria
 
to the minerals sector are displayed in figure 7. The implicit reasoning
 
in the display will then be translated into statements of institutional
 
requirements and recommendations.
 
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The political, social, economic, and even technological trends of
 
today indicate that the most significant grounds for decision seem to be
 
matters of participation and representation in the vital affairs of the
 
nation. Such grounds are no less significant in 'the minerals sector.
 
Concepts of participation and representation will enable the mobilization
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of academic and industrial sectors to meet technological challenges.
 
They will enable the marshalling of public involvement in finding
 
solutions to problems affecting the environment and still preserving
 
the productivity base of the industrial society.
 
These considerations lead to our recommendation that all sectors
 
of our economy be utilized in meeting the technological problems of
 
minerals. Implementation of this recommendation will require establish­
ment of a new research and development institution within government.
 
This is not a radical recommendation. We are merely responding in a
 
specific way to the earlier recommendations of the Bell Report which
 
called for the creation of a new kind of research and development insti­
tution.28 In a sense we are echoing Bruce Smith who views institutional
 
arrangements as the logical focus for national progrbm planning debates,
 
and who has recommended the institutionalization of~the interplay between
 
public and private initiatives.29 The recommendation responds to criti­
cisms by Meg Greenfield and others of scientists who seek freedom from
 
public scrutiny as they plan and conduct national science policy.30
 
Finally, the recommendation responds to the new concepts of William
 
McElroy and the National Science Foundation and their call for new insti­
tutions which will make science more responsive to social needs. 31
 
If the technological decisions and evaluation processes are made
 
institutionally open to the scrutiny and impact of representative govern­
ment and public participation, the dangers of loss of accountability and
 
responsibility are lessened. The prospects of responsiveness of federal
 
technological programs to the public interest are heightened.
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Some years ago, the Resources for the Future staff made several recom­
mendations to the Interior Department on how the Department could meet
 
the challenges of mineral resources depletion. Included among the recom­
mendations was a very modest proposal for the establishment of scientific
 
and technological program review groups, including the representation of
 
non-scientists acquainted with resource problems.32 This modest proposal
 
was not directly implemented, but now we need to incorporate this idea
 
into a new, far reaching institutional form within the Interior Department.
 
D. RECONM[ENDED: A NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MINERALS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The present planning and operation of governmental programs in
 
minerals research and development is through a multitude of agencies with
 
little coordination and no single focal point of polity or evaluation.
 
We are recommending that this pattern of particularism and uncoordinated 
activity be pulled together and given focus through the institutional
 
mechanism of a National Institute of Minerals Research and Development
 
(NIMRAD).
 
This recommendation is not new. Eighteen years ago the Paley Com­
mission came to a similar conclusion and proposed the establishment of a
 
single agency "to keep track of public and private research affecting
 
production and use of materials in light of current needs and future
 
prospects, and to make sure that urgent research projects which industry
 
could not be expected to undertake were referred to public or private
 
organizations capable of carrying them out.,.33 The Paley Commission 
proposal was for an agency which would be a part of the President's Ex­
ecutive Office and which would have informational, appraisal, evalu­
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ational, and auditing responsibilities. The recommendation was not
 
implemented.
 
In 1959, the Federal Council for Science and Technology established
 
an Interagency Coordinating Committee on Materials Research and Develop­
ment. 
The committee was composed of representatives of AEC, Defense,
 
NASA, NSF, NBS, Bureau of the Budget, and the Bureau of Mines. This
 
committee established a program of interdisciplinary laboratories for
 
materials research by contract with twelve universities. An equipment
 
grant program was established in seventy-nine universities. The con­
cept of the Committee on Materials Research and Development is a direct
 
forerunner of the recommendation for NIMRAD, carried to a much further
 
extent.
 
Similar institutional proposals have been advanced in areas of
 
biology, urban development, and oceanography; and a recent proposal has
 
been made for the establishment of a government-wide'National Institute
 
of Technology.35 While these proposals have remained in the idea stage,
 
a more concrete example of action along the recommended lines came in
 
1968 with the establishment of the National Eye Institute. This Insti­
tute followed the example of previously established institutes within
 
NIH. The purpose of the National Eye Institute is "to provide a clear
 
focus for the efforts of those interested in eye research."36 This pur­
pose is implemented within the Public Health Service, and the operations
 
of the Institute are influenced by an advisory council. In this, the
 
National Eye Institute has followed the lead of the pioneering National
 
Cancer Institute, established by legislation in 1937, which enabled the
 
government "to join in common purpose with.the nonfederal scientific
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community in the support of research activity of broad public
 
interest. ,37
 
The establishment of NIMRAD along the lines of the National Eye
 
Institute would provide a linking mechanism between technological means
 
and social ends in the minerals sector. It would also serve as a focal
 
arena for participation and representation in the decision making process
 
of government, industry, the scientific community, and the citizenry.
 
These interrelationships would provide opportunity for the further
 
linking of basic and applied research to political goals as revealed
 
through representative political processes and to national objectives
 
as developed through governmental planning and budgetary processes.
 
The conceptual relationships of NIMRAD are illustrated in figure 8.
 
The specific institutional format recommended for NIMRAD, in
 
keeping with the relevant criteria for institutional choice, includes
 
the following elements:
 
1. Objectives. The principal objective of NIMRAD would be to in­
sure the adequate and dependable flow of minerals and fuels, to meet
 
national needs at a reasonable social and economic cost, consistent with
 
the requirements of an expanding economy and the national defense. 
A
 
secondary objective would be to increase the minerals technology capa­
bilities of government, industry, and universities, and to marshal
 
these capabilities in a concerted attack on the minerals problems facing
 
the nation. Additional objectives would include enlisting the public in
 
the task of finding solutions to minerals problems, and giving priority
 
attention to solving environmental problems created by minerals ex­
traction and utilization.
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2. Establishment. The establishment of NIMRAD would be a logical
 
addition to Senator Allott's proposed legislation to establish a national
 
minerals policy. 
 IMRAD would provide the needed action element to over­
see policy implementation.
 
3.. Organizational Location. 
In order to assure maintenance of 
full governmental responsibility, NIMRAD should be located fully ithin 
the federal governmental structure and specifically within the Interior 
Department which has primary responsibility for mineral resources and
 
environment. Location within an executive department insures a degree
 
of responsiveness of a.government institution to the'will of the people
 
as expressed through the electoral process.
 
4. Implementation. The implementation of RIJAD should be in
 
three stages. First, appointment of an executive director and a repre­
sentative board of directors to begin advising on policy 'directions and
 
resource'allocations. The first stage is regarded as minimum imple­
mentation. 
The second and third stages could include the incorporation
 
of existing governmental activities and the eventual construction of
 
physical facilities. NIMRAD could eventually absorb the research and
 
resource development activities of the Bureau of Mines, leaving the
 
regulatory and enforcement functions related to mine health and safety
 
in a separate organizational setting. This accords well with the
 
recently announced reorganization of the Bureau of Nines which has
 
separated its health and safety enforcement functions from its minerals
 
research, resources, and environmental development functions.38 Uti­
lization of the research and resource development capabilities of the
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Bureau of Mines would give NINRAD a ready made technological base for
 
its activities. Additionally, the minerals exploration research function
 
of the Geological Survey might also be added.
 
5. Management and Direction. The executive director of NIMRAD 
should be a presidential appointee, with the advise and consent of the 
Senate, at least at Executive Level V. Staff assistance to the executive 
director should be provided by career staff experts in appropriate areas 
of the physical sciences, engineering, and the social sciences. 
6. Participation and Representation. A board of directors should
 
be established to advise the NIMRAD executive director. This board
 
should be composed of representatives from Congress, federal agencies,
 
state governments, universities, industry, labor, and the general public 
as represented by conservation and environmental protection interest 
groups. The board members should be appointed by the President or by the 
Secretary of the Interior, and they should meet regularly and periodi­
cally. The board should designate standing committees based dither on 
functional areas of technology or on commodities. Membership in each 
committee should include a broad representation of subject matter 
specialists and knowledgeable laymen. The committees will function in 
a recommending capacity to the board on matters of minerals policy, 
project allotment, institutional development, and monitoring and evalu­
ation of research. 
7. Functions. The principal functions of NIMRAD should include
 
continuing appraisal of resource supply/demand conditions; determination
 
of areas of research-emphasis; award of research projects to competing
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institutions; encouragement of pooling of resources by government,
 
industry, and universities; oversight of intra-mural research oper­
ations; and development of stronger minerals education institutions.
 
8. Operation. Through planning and policy evaluation, NIMRAD
 
should determine technological objectives. These objectives should be
 
translated into action programs through the recommendations of the
 
functional or commodity committees. The committees will evaluate and
 
recommend research projects to the board. Project allocations should
 
be on the basis of competition between intra- and extra-mural research
 
facilities. Work will be evaluated periodically for its contribution
 
to the accomplishment of program objectives.
 
9. Physical Facilities. In the first stages of implementation, 
no major physical facilities will be required. The executive director 
and the board of directors, with its attendant committees, should be based 
in office and meeting space in Washington, D. C. As the organization of 
NIMRAD develops, the physical location of its direction and management 
functions should be in conjunction with a substantial intra-mural research 
facility. The required relocation of the Bureau of Mines research center 
presently located at the University of Maryland will provide a logical 
opportunity for establishment of a new facility for NIMRAD. This facility 
can provide research equipment and opportunity for researchers from a
 
wide variety of participation institutions and also training opportunities
 
for graduate students.
 
E. PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
 
As previously noted, many suggestions have been made in the past
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hundred years for establishment of governmental institutions for miner­
als technology. Some institutions have been established, but only in a
 
fragmented and particularistic fashion. One may well question why no
 
suggestion for a unified and coordinated approach to minerals problems
 
has yet been implemented. One may also question the implications of
 
past neglect for the recommendation contained in these pages.
 
At the outset, policy is not made and institutions are not created
 
in a vacuum. They respond to social needs made manifest through the
 
political and economic process. In the minerals sector, the political and
 
economic process has not brought forward- the kind of institution that seems
 
from an objective and rational standpoint to be essential for continued
 
national growth and material strength. Marmy reasons for this may be
 
suggested.
 
First, there is the fragmented nature of the industry itself and
 
its relatively low level of technological intensity. Second, there is 
the separateness that exists between the primary governmental minerals 
agency - the U. S. Bureau of Mines - and the minerals industry. As 
Norton Long pointed out years ago, governmental agencies in the American 
system must develop constituency relationships and must serve as channels 
of representation for the constituents in order to carry out agency re­
sponsibilities.39 Third, there is a separateness between the Interior
 
Department and the Congress which was revealed by the Department's
 
refusal for ten years to support Senator Allott's call for a national
 
minerals policy. Only in 1969 did the Department take a fav6rable posi­
tion on Senator Allott's proposed legislation.
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Other possible reasons include the decline of the minerals edu­
cational establishment. Little initiative in any concerted 
sense comes
 
today from the universities where minerals studies are in ,astate of
 
advancing entropy. Finally, there is no sense of dramatic emergency
 
about minerals problems. There is no "minerals Sputnik" to jar the
 
national consciousness. A change from a decreasing to an increasing
 
cost curve for minerals is insidious, not dramatic. This is coupled.
 
with the public "gold rush" mentaiity, alluded to earlier, which opti­
mistically assumes that the riches of the earth only need to be discovered
 
in the romantic ways of the forty-niners in California and "The Unsinkable
 
Molly Brown" in Colorado in the nineteenth century.
 
Given these kinds of conditions and attitudes3 the prospects for
 
the establishment of a National Institute of Minerals Research and Develop­
ment becoie somewhat remote. And yet, a beginning exists with Senator
 
Allott's proposed legislation to establish a mining and minerals policy.
 
This bill (S. 719) offers a vehicle to which could be attached an insti­
tutional mechanism such as NIMRAD. If this were done, the combination
 
of policy and institution would then serve as a rallying point or at
 
least as an arena within which industry, the educational establishment,
 
state governments, and the public could come together with the executive
 
and legislative branches of government to begin working out solutions to
 
national minerals and materials problems.
 
The existing situation in the minerals sector is not really a
 
vacuum. The constituent elements are merely too remote from each other.
 
We are suggesting that the combination of national policy and institutional
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mechanism will serve to pull the elements closer together and speed up
 
their reactions to each other in a kind of organizational Boyle's Law.
 
There is nothing radical in this proposal. The concepts and mechanisms
 
exist in other governmental program areas. But the initiative in the
 
minerals sector must come from government, and in this case from a
 
joint enterprise of the executive and legislative branches. An act of
 
initiative here, with modest funding, will serve as a stdrting point
 
for pulling together the pieces of the minerals sector.
 
F. CONCLUSION.
 
The overriding purpose of the proposed National Institute of Miner­
als Research and Development is to establish an institution which will be
 
in reality what George Kolstad has described in theory for the AEC as
 
"an adventure in the purpose and performance of a fret people building
 
private and public institutions, large and small, and in the interaction
 
of these people in their personal relationships, their community, their
 
state, their region and their country. 0 Successful implementation of
 
the adventure will mean full utilization of all sectors of the nation in
 
meeting increasing challenges of mineral supply and utilization. It will
 
mean establishment of national policy, careful governmental planning of
 
technological programs, mutual effort of all sectors in accomplishing
 
objectives, and contributions and participation from the broad public
 
constituency.
 
The proposed National Institute of Minerals Research 'nd Develop­
ment can serve as a focal point for translating national minerals policy
 
into effective programs. This can be done through the recognition and
 
and encouragement of interrelationships between governmental, academic,
 
and industrial enterprises. Additionally, the Institute can serve as
 
a forum for greater participation in a vital area of national policy
 
by conservation organizations and by representatives of other lay citizen
 
groups. The need is apparent. An institutional mechanism is necessary.
 
If establishment of the Institute properly takes into account consider­
ations of the scientific establishment, the governmental structure,
 
funding, political support, industrial development, public participation
 
and representation, and effective internal organization, then the national
 
interest will be well served.
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